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levels, among agencies such as the IMF and OECD, and thi-ough NGOs
initiatives such as the Intemational Budget Project. At the domestic level,
where budgeting takes place, some jurisdictions have enacted legislation
to formalize their commitments to fiscal disclosure. This paper tracks the
emergence of global norms about fiscal transparency through the
interaction of 'soft law' measures with more conventional legal forms,
drawing on examples from both higher and lower income countries. It
offers a critical analysis of the various puiposes and interests that
transparency may serve, and of the role of international norms and legal
institutions in shaping domestic political processes of budgeting. We find
that prevailing models of budget transparency focus primarily on
reinforcing fiscal discipline, and on the provision of information to
establish credibility for financial markets, international lenders and aid
donors. These imperatives have overshadowed attempts to shed light on
other dimensions of fiscal policy, such as its distributive impact and its
democratic legitimacy.
As a result, we conclude, the current
understanding of "best practices" in this field will be of limited use in
generating the political consensus needed to ensure equitable development
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D E F I N I N G F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY: TRANSNATIONAL
NORMS, D O M E S T I C LAWS AND T H E P O L I T I C S O F
B U D G E T ACCOUNTABILITY
Lisa Philipps* & Miranda Stewart**

I . INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s the issue of fiscal transparency has attracted
increasing attention at transnational and domestic policy levels, among
intemational institutions, govemments and non-govemment actors
concemed with fiscal policy. The OECD and IMF have embarked on
significant programs to develop standards and codes of conduct on budget
transparency and to assess country practices in this area.' Nongovemmental organizations (NGOs) have developed their own indices to
measure and compare fiscal transparency intemationally.^ At the domestic
Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada,
lphilipps@osgoode.vorku.edii.ca .
'* Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, Australia,
m.stewart(fl),unimelb. edu.au .The authors welcome comments on any aspect of this paper.
' See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "OECD Best Practices
for Budget Transparency" (2001) 1(3) OECD Journal on Budgeting 8; International
Monetary Fund, IMF Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency' (2007)
<http://www.imforg/external/np/pp/2007/eng/05I507c.pdf> at 19 September 2008 and
Fiscal Affairs Department, Manual on Fiscal Transparency (2007) International
Monetary Fund <http://www.imf org/external/np/pp/2007/eng/I01907ni.pdf> at 19
September 2008 (revised from the Fiscal Affairs Department, Manual on Fiscal
Transparency
(2001)
International
Monetaiy
Fund
<http://www.imf org/external/np/fad/trans/manual/manual.pdft> at 3 October 2008).
' In the late 1990s the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) collaborated
with the International Budget Project (IBP), based in Washington, D.C., to develop a
sui"vey questionnaire for evaluating budget transparency which was then applied to South
Africa: see Alta Folscher, Warren Ki'afchik and Isaac Shapiro, "Transparency and
Participation in the Budget Process: South Africa: A Countiy Report" (Institute for
Democracy in South Africa: Budget Information Sei-vice and the International Budget
Project, 2000). This methodology has been adopted for studies of several other countries.
Details of Latin American study. The Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities, a non-
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level, where budgeting takes place, some jurisdictions have enacted
legislation to formalize their commitments to fiscal disclosure. Academic
scholars have begun to take note of these trends and to publish studies on
the extent to which governments are conforming to global norms, and how
this is (or is not) affecting fiscal policy outcomes.^
The O E C D has described the budget as "[tjhe single most
important policy document of governments, where policy objectives are
reconciled and implemented in concrete terms.'* As indicated by this
statement and as has frequently been said about taxation, the
(re)distribution of benefits and burdens through the budget is an inherently
political process requiring negotiation of a fiscal compact or bargain
establishing legitimacy and fairness for sustainability in the longer term.^
A central argument of the paper is that fiscal transparency is not a
politically neutral public good but one that is open to different definitions
that sei-ve different interests. Fiscal transparency norms as they are
currently promulgated and implemented reveal both a distributional and a
democratic deficit. They are focused primarily on fiscal disciphne and on
the provision of infonnation to establish credibility for financial markets,
intemational lenders and aid donors and fail to take seriously the political
centrality of budgeting. This paper seeks to address these deficits through a
focus on two gaps in the existing research on budget transparency norms.

government organisation (NGO) based in Washington, D.C., launched its Open Budget
Index in 2006 with the goal of scratinizing fiscal transparency practices in different
countries around the world: International Budget Project, Open Budget Initiative (2006)
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities <http://www.openbudgetindex.org/> at 7 July
2008. For information on the histoiy and goals of the Open Budget Index see the website
of the IBP: International Budget Partnership, Transparency and Participation in the
Budget
Process
(2006)
Center
on
Budget
and
Policy
Priorities
<http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/index.htm> at 7 July 2008.
^ Francisco Bastida and Bernardino Benito, "Central Government Budget Practices and
Transparency: an International Comparison" (2007) 85(3) Public Administration 667.
OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, above n 1, 7.
' Nicholas Kaldor, "Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax" (1962-63) 41 Foreign
Affairs 410, 418; Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (1988); Sven Steinmo, TaxcUion
and Democracy: Swedish, British, and Americcm Approaches to Financing the Modern
State (1993); Mick Moore and Lise Rakner, "The New Politics of Taxation and
Accountability in Developing Countries" (2002) 33(3) Institute of Development Studies
Bulletin 1.
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The first is a lack of critical analysis conceming the purposes and
meanings of transparency in the context of budgeting. The second is a lack
of attention to the role of law or legal institutions in securing different
visions of fiscal transparency. We hope to contribute on these fronts by
assessing how the concept of fiscal transparency is being defined in
transnational legal discourse.
In order to draw out the range of meanings that can be attached to
fiscal transparency we particularly consider the extent to which the various
codes and statutes promote transparency regarding the distributive and
social justice impacts of budgetary decisions and the democratic oversight
of govemment budgets by legislative and civil society actors. We find that
these dimensions of transparency have been widely neglected in the design
of prevailing norms which are more concerned with exposing any fiscal
impradence, mismanagement or dishonesty to outside scmtiny. While
those aspects of transparency are obviously critical, they have
overshadowed any efforts to shed light on the distributive impact of tax
and spending pohcies, or to give relatively marginalized groups of citizens
a more effective voice in budget processes. As a result, we argue, the "best
practices" that currently dominate this field will be of limited help in
generating the political consensus needed to ensure equitable
development. These deficits should concem all of us but may be especially
problematic for those developing countries for which issues of poverty
reduction and economic sovereignty are most pressing. The paper also
examines some alternative definitions of fiscal transparency that do more
to address these issues.
An inquiry into the nature, goals and uses of fiscal transparency
leads to a number of questions that we note here and will return to below.
First, what is the role of law in the spread and refoim of budget
transparency norms and in establishing "transparency" as an identifiable
measure of good governance (however that be defined)? This is a part of
the broader question of the role of law in development.^ Does law "matter"
* The relationship between law and development has begun to be critically analysed by
many scholars after nearly two decades of "law reform" which has frequently been less
rather than more successfiil: see, eg, Kevin Davis and Michael Trebilcock, "The
relationship between law and development: optimists versus skeptics" (2008)
forthcoming in American Journal of Comparative Law ; David Kennedy, "Laws and
Developments" in John Hatchard and Amanda Perry-Kessaris (eds), Law and
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for development at all and more specifically, what is the importance of the
"rule of law" and "good governance" in the fiscal context? I f it is
important, what role might budget transparency laws play in a particular
country"s "development" process and who might they serve in this
process? Further, to what extent does it matter i f budget norms are legal
(hard law) compared to "soft law" norms, administrative practices or
market incentives?
Second, we emphasise in this paper the importance of fiscal
transparency in empowering engagement of citizens to participate in
establishing a fair and legitimate fiscal policy in a country, both through
their representatives in a democratic legislature and more broadly. This
draws on broader theories of engaged, deliberative democracy in which
laws play the important role of establishing the rules of engagement in the
decision-making process.' As we see the budget as central to political
decision-making about taxing and spending, we advocate the expansion of
budget transparency laws to fulfil this role and identify the shortcomings
of current fiscal codes and norms that fail to address this audience for
transparency and accountability.
In Part 2 we analyze the reasons why fiscal transparency has
surfaced so widely and insistently as a law reform issue at this particular
juncture. Part 3 tracks the paths and networks by which these norms have
been developed and transmitted globally, through initiatives at various
international and domestic levels. Part 4 provides more details about the
content of fiscal transparency, according to the dominant model associated
principally with the IMF. Part 5 takes a closer look at how various fiscal
transparency codes and statutes deal with (or do not deal with) issues of
distributive impact and politics. Part 6 examines democratic participation
in the budget process. In Part 7 we discuss the implicafions of this case
study for the broader project of "ruling the world" including the role of
law or norms and the implications for national and global governance. We
emphasize the need to design transnational fiscal noiins that foster
inclusive institutions of democracy at the country level, recognizing that
nation states remain the primaiy actors in foiinulating fiscal policy, even
Development: Facing Complexit}' in the 21st Centuiy: Essays in Honour of Peter Slinn
(2003) 17.
' Philip N Pettit, "Depoliticizing Democracy" (2004) 17 Ratio Juris 52.
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as we also identify the beginnings of an architecture that could provide an
inclusionary framework for taxing and spending in the global context.

I I . T H E ROOTS OF F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY
DISCOURSE: HISTORICAL SOURCES AND C O N T E X T
Fiscal policy - taxing, spending, bon'owing, lending - is at the core
of govemmental exercise of political power. Budgeting is a process for
organizing govemment fiscal activities and pmdence in fiscal management
- in some commonsense way, matching expenditures to revenues - is the
essence of budgeting. Yet while the analogy with household budgeting is
often made, the key difference is that a govemmenf's overall budget
constraint is not set by any objective standard: what a government can
raise in resources to spend is limited only by its capacity and desire to do
so and its distributive and allocative goals. The budget constraint is a
moveable feast, itself a set of political choices, capabilities and
distributions.
The basic principle of fiscal transparency, that govemmental fiscal
activities should be subject to pubhc scmtiny, is not new. A central
purpose of budgeting has always been to ensure a degree of transparency,
and therefore accountability, regarding the nature and quantum of public
spending and taxation.* The institutional and procedural framework for
raising, appropriating, spending and accounting for public fluids is
typically laid out in a country"s constitution and financial management
legislation, and supplemented by longstanding convention. Even in
developing countries such "organic finance laws" have generally been in
place for several decades based on administrative practices entrenched in
colonial times, though in practice these formal mles may not be fully
implemented.^
Despite these traditional commitments to public budgeting, the
term "fiscal transparency" has recently obtained renewed currency as the
banner for a host of policy initiatives designed to regularize budgeting
See Aaron Wildavsky, "A Budget for All Seasons? Why the Traditional Budget Lasts "
(1978) 38(6) Public Administration Review 501, 502,
' Mike Stevens, "Institutional and Incentive Issues in Public Financial Management
Reform in Poor Countries" (Working Paper No 35106, World Bank, 2004), 5.
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practices and mandate disclosure of specific information by govemments
around the world. In this Part we explore the question of why this
discourse of fiscal transparency has emerged so forcefully since the mid1990s. We suggest it has two principal sources.
The first source was the general tum to neoliberal models of
economic policy, in which govemments lost authority as economic
decision makers and were made subject in various ways to more intensive
forms of market discipline, in particular to control or reduce budget
deficits.'° This included the discipline of credit-rating agencies that
directly impacted the cost to govemments of financing a budget deficit,
and of market analysts who influenced where mobile capital would be
invested. In developing countries such market pressures were reinforced
by explicit conditions imposed on concessional lending and other forms of
aid. In order to establish credibility with these increasingly powerful
external audiences and allow them to assess investment risks, govemments
had to be more forthcoming with detailed information about country
finances.
The constraint of government action in economic matters first
became apparent in relation to monetary policy. Developed country
govemments have evolved various methods by which monetary policy is
institutionalised in such as way as, at least to some extent, to take it out of
the hands of elected govemments." Most developed countries have
established frameworks that delegate the setting of interest rates to an
independent central bank. Monetary policy also may involve conti'ols on
exchange rates in particular in many developing countries (for example,
countries may peg their currency to the U S dollar, or establish currency
boards or limits on currency exchange). However, the key goal of
See, eg, Peter A Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of
Economic Policymaking in Britain" (1993) 25(3) Comparative Politics 275, 285,
identifying this "shift" in the "locus of authority over macroeconomic issues" away from
the Treasury and Keynesian economics towards monetarism, cemented under Margaret
Thatcher and institutionalised through the 1980s and 1990s, although the UK Treasuiy set
interest rates until enactment of the Bank of England Act in 1998 under Chancellor
Gordon Brown, which provided operational independence to the Bank. See also Carl
Emmerson, Chris Frayne and Sarah Love, "Updating the UK"s Code for Fiscal Stability"
(Working Paper No W04/29 Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2004), 17.
" Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10.
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monetary policy in developed countries is the control of inflation, and the
key mechanism in an era of floating currencies and open economies is the
adjustment of the interest rate. As inflation is influenced in part by beliefs
and prior expectations, a govemment could use a monetary target "to
influence these expectations" and "as long as the target can be committed
to credibly, expectations of inflation attaining its target level in themselves
create conditions favourable to that level of inflation being realised."'^
What is most interesting about this transformation here is the rise of a need
for govemments to establish "credibility" with markets - and their loss of
authority as economic decision-makers.
New Zealand was a pioneer in legalizing central bank control over
interest rates, during its period of massive economic liberalisation in the
1980s. It established a monetary policy framework a frill five years before
it addressed fiscal policy, in the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act (NZ)
1989.'^ This Act was proudly explained in 1996 as having "no exact
parallels anywhere else in the world" in establishing a process for setting
inflation targets which would be implemented by the Banlc "without
interference from Government, Treasuiy, or anybody else".''* The Bank
would report to Parliament and "since uncertainty involves costs, the
objective of monetary policy, and the modus operandi of policy
implementation, should be as open and transparent as possible". It was
claimed that the same philosophy applies to fiscal policy:
the key is transparency
- indeed,
chronologically it was the transparency in the
Reserve Bank Act which inspired the idea of
attempting something similar for fiscal policy.
Government"s hands are tied only by the need to
make policy intentions absolutely unambiguous to
Ibid. See also IMF Manual on monetaiy policy and central bank independence, at 26.
'•^ Specifically, the goal of this Act was to "Miildoon-proof monetary policy, a reference
to the previous long-standing Prime Minister of New Zealand: Donald T Brash, "New
Zealand"s Remarkable Reforms" (Speech delivered at the Fifth Annual Hayek Memorial
Lecture, Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 4 June 1996). The Institute of Economic
Affairs bills itself as right wing and "the UIC"s original free-market think-tank", begun in
1955 (see Institute of Economic Affairs, <http://www.iea.org.uk/> at 10 October 2008).
Brash"s speech also discussed the NZ fiscal responsibility reforms in depth.
Brash, above n 13.
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- surely a fundamentally sound

The IMF monitors monetary transparency and practices as well as
fiscal transparency and it released its Code of Good Practices on Monetary
and Financial Policies on 26 September 1999.
Govemments have not formally delegated their powers to set fiscal
policy as they have with respect to monetary policy. However, in the last
decade, a range of legal and administrative constraints have been placed
by govemments on their own fiscal decision-making. The question of why
governments - in particular elected govemments - should agree to
constrain themselves in this way is an interesting one and the answer is not
obvious, depending as it does on a much broader view as to the
relationship between the legislature and executive, the state and the market
and the size of the state.The evidence suggests that for fiscal policy, as
for monetaiy policy, the desire to strengthen credibility vis-a-vis extemal
audiences has been the driving factor." In particular, credibility regarding
deficit constraint has been an ongoing theme in the push to establish fiscal
frameworks. Trends to increase legislative control over budgeting,
including imposition of fiscal rales and other measures, have been
identified as a reaction to concems about "precarious" fiscal balances and
about "losing the confidence of world credit markets".'*
Initially, many countries legislated harder fiscal caps that expressly
require a balanced budget or place limits on permissible spending or
'^Ibid.
This question is asked by Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10 and see also Allen
Schick, "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting" (2003) 3(3) OECD Journal on
Budgeting 7, 8: "Why have democracies accepted or imposed fiscal limits on themselves,
and why should we expect these limits to be effective when they ran counter to the
preferences of voters and politicians?"
There have been a few suggestions to make fiscal policy "more like" monetaiy pohcy a lever to be pulled in response to economic conditions - and thereby take some of the
"politics" out of setting tax rates. See Nicholas Gruen, "Greater Independence for Fiscal
Institutions" (2001) 1(1) OECD Journal on Budgeting 89. So far, this path has not been
taken up by either the international institutions or countiy governments.
Paul Posner and Chung-Keun Park, "Role of the Legislature in the Budget Process:
Recent Trends and Innovations" (2007) 7(3) OECD Journal on Budgeting 11, 6-7;
Schick, above n 16.
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borrowing, sometimes with schedules for deficit elimination. Examples
include the expenditure ceihngs introduced in many developed countries
such as Finland, Japan, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland (and in the
European Union generally through the Stability and Growth Pact,
discussed in part 3.E below).However, experience with set targets or
ceihngs during the 1990s was not always positive. Academic researchers
concluded that numerical deficit or surplus targets or balanced-budget
laws are ineffective and tend to be too inflexible and to increase incentives
for "creative accounting" by the executive.^° Experience demonstrated that
these more coercive restraints were often ignored, or worse they
encouraged gaming as governments tried to hide non-compliance through
accounting changes or off-budget spending.^' The IMF has criticized the
"perverse incentives" that such rules may generate to engage in "one-off
measures or creative accounting", unless they are backed by transparent
reporting "such that non-compliance can be easily detected and

" Isabelle Joumard et al, "Enhancing the Cost Effectiveness of Public Spending:
Experience in OECD Countries" [2003](2) OECD Economic Studies 109, 120 and Tables
2 and 3. Schick claims that prior to World War I I , "virtually all democratic countries
embraced a balanced budget rule, including some that often breached the rule or did not
have any legal constraint on unbalanced budgets", above n 16, 15.
'" Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, "Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process" (1996)
86(2) American Economic Review 401 and references to unpublished papers cited therein.
At least some of this research took place inside the IMF, whose preoccupation with
budget deficits is indicated by Alberto Alesina and Roberto Perotti, "The Political
Economy of Budget Deficits" (Working Paper No 4637, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1994); See also James L Chan, "Major Federal Budget Laws of the United
States" in Siamack Shojai (ed). Budget Deficits and Debt: A Globed Perspective (1999)
17.
^' See Miguel Braun and Nicolas Gadano, "What are fiscal rales for? A critical analysis
of the Argentine experience", CEPAL Review 91 (April 2007); Allan Drazen, "Fiscal
Rules from a Political Economy Perspective" (Paper presented at the IMF-Worid Bank
Conference on Rules-Based Fiscal PoUcy in Emerging Market Economies, Oaxaca, 14-16
Febraaiy 2002), 13-17; "Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year
Ended April 30, 1998" (International Monetary Fund, 1998), 40; George ICopits and Jon
Craig, "Transparency in Government Operations" (Occasional Paper No 158,
International Monetaiy Fund, 1998), 2; IMF Manual (2007), above n 1, 40-42;
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Fiscal Sustainability: The
Contribution of Fiscal Rules" [2002](2) OECD Economic Outlook 117; Lisa Philipps,
"The Rise of Balanced Budget Laws in Canada: Legislating Fiscal (Ir)responsibility"
(1996) 34 Osgoode Hall Law Joimial 681; and Charles Wyplosz, "Fiscal Policy:
Institutions versus Rules" (2005) 191 National Institute Economic Review 70, 74-76.
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addressed". As a result, the IMF Code does not advocate the adoption of
substantive fiscal caps. Instead the Manual discusses such fiscal rules as
possible one element of an overall policy of fiscal transparency, stating
that this discussion "should not be taken as an endorsement of the
practices themselves".^^
The need to establish fiscal credibility in the eyes of financial
markets, donors and investors has been a key factor driving budget
transparency initiatives and other govemance reforms in both developing
and developed countries. As one IMF staff member explained to an
audience consisting largely of representatives from developing countries:
In fiscal policy perhaps nothing matters quite so
much these days as what the financial markets
think you are doing and how well you are doing it,
and to add to the financial markets I think you
increasingly have to take into account the fact that
the donors like to know what it is that a country is
doing and how well it is doing it.^'*
Likewise, transparency initiatives in developed countries have
been associated with efforts to tighten fiscal discipline and signal
"credibility" to the markets. The O E C D has recommended strategies for
member countries to control spending in the face of pressures due to
population aging and infrastmcture gaps and has emphasized the role that
transparency can play in reinforcing a commitment to fiscal restraint, for
example by exposing the cost of maintaining programs over the longer
term, or the cost of tax expenditures.^^ As Schick notes:
"From New Zealand to the United States,
developed countries embarked on a massive effort
IMF Manual (2007), above n I , 41. Similarly the OECD suggests that more coercive
fiscal rales such as balanced budget laws or spending caps may be ineffective unless
accompanied by transparency rales that prevent governments from hiding certain
expenditures off budget: Joumard et al, above n 19, *.
" IMF Manual (2007), above n 1, para 22 p. 14-15 and discussion at p. 15.
' ' Barry Potter, "The IMF Transparency Code" (Paper presented at the Second
Conference of the International Budget Project, Cape Town, 23 Febraaiy 1999).
' ' Joumard et al, above n 19, 5 and 12-23.
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of "govemment reengineering" to restore
discipline in the budget process and to better target
dwindling budgetary resources towards higher
priority uses."^^
While pmdent fiscal management - matching expenditures to
revenues - has a commonsense appeal, what is less obvious on the face of
the transparency debate are the constraints on taxation which, when
combined with the spending constraints, have the ideological goal of
restricting the overall size of govemment. In developed countries,
reduction of taxes on capital and mobile labour has been a constant trend
and refrain since the beginning of the 1980s. In developing countries, the
trend is more complex: it is accepted that taxes should be increased so as
to enable proper provision by govemment but a combination of economic
globalisation (especially the mobility of capital) and domestic
distributional politics puts great pressure on the abihty of states to do so.
We have written about the focus on fiscal deficits and the politics of tax
reform in other fomms and do not spend further time on it here;^''
however, it remains an essential part of the neoliberal tum to which fiscal
transparency noiTns can, in part, be traced.
The second major impetus for the new discourse of fiscal
transparency came from changing ideas about governance that affected
developing and developed countries in different ways. In the later 1990s
development theorists and agencies began to emphasize the need to
support institutional reforms or "good govemance" in developing
countries, and to strengthen initiatives to reduce poverty and address the
social side of development. These ideas took hold in the wake of
widespread dissatisfaction with the neoliberal model and particularly the
Alien Schick, "A Contemporary Approach to Public Expenditure Management"
(Working Paper No 35116, World Bank, 1998), "Foreword".
' ' See Lisa Philipps, "Taxing the Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age
of Privatization" (2000) 63(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 111; and Lisa Philipps,
"Discursive Deficits: A Feminist Perspective on the Power of Technical Kjiowledge in
Fiscal Law and Policy" (1996) 11(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Society' 141; Miranda
Stewart, "Global Trajectories of Tax Reform; The Discourse of Tax Reform in
Developing and Transition Countries" (2003) 44 Harvard International Law Journal 139,
*; Miranda Stewart and Sunita Jogarajan, "The International Monetary Fund and Tax
Refomi" [2004](2) British Tax Review 146, *.
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economic and political failure of structural adjustment programs in many
developing countries. The United Nations Millennium Declaration of 2000
reflected these shifting attitudes and laid out specific targets for reducing
the number of people living in extreme poverty and other measurable
improvements in human welfare.^^ The UN Financing for Development
process examined how resources can be made available to achieve these
goals. In 2001, a High-Level Panel chaired by Ernesto Zedillo reported a
series of Recommendations.^^ The Panel emphasised the need for public
investments in education, health, nutrition and other basic social programs
and stated:
Financing an adequate level of social pubhc
expenditure while limiting budget deficits calls for
substantial tax revenues. Most countries of the
developing world must undertake significant tax
reforms i f they are to raise the additional revenue
that they need.^°
The Zedillo Report stated further that developing countries
themselves bear the primary responsibility for achieving growth and
equitable development, in part by "creating the conditions that make it
possible to secure the needed financial resources for investment." These
^'United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res 55/2, UN GAOR, 55* sess. Agenda
Item 60(b), UN Doc A/Res/55/2 (2000). Notably the Declaration states that creating "an
environment... conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty" depends on
"good governance" within each country and at the international level, as well as
"transparency in the financial, monetaiy and trading systems" (Sections 111.12 and 13).
See Kerry Rittich, "The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms
and the Incorporation of the Social" in David M Tmbek and Alvaro Santos (eds). The
New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (2006) 203 for analysis of
the social turn in development discourse.
' ' Ernesto Zedillo et al, "Recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Financing for
Developmenf (United Nations, 2001) (Zedillo Report). The Zedillo Report was followed
by a major UN Conference on Financing for Development: see Report of the
International Conference on Financing for Development, UN Doc A/CONF. 198/11
(2002). The Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to
Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus is to be held in Doha, Qatar,
from 29 November to 2 December 2008: Follow-up International Conference on
Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus
(2007) United Nations <http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/> at 25 September 2008.
Zedillo et al, above n 29, 3.
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conditions include "[f]irst and foremost.. .good governance that commands
the consent of the govemed, and effective and impartial mle of law including relentless combat of cormption...". Budget transparency
initiatives can be seen as part of this good govemance agenda aimed at
securing resources for development. As we discuss in part 6 below, a
second element of "govemance" reform has been an increase in
consultation on policy reform and its implementation, in both developing
and developed countries, a trend which can been seen as both a logical
consequence of increased transparency or information-sharing and which
has also developed as part of broader efforts to improve expenditure and
tax pohcy outcomes. In sum, fiscal transparency laws are part of the shift
to govemance in the global context of fiscal reform for development.

I I I . T H E SPREAD OF F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY NORMS
GLOBALLY
This Part tracks the emergence and spread of budget transparency
norms since the mid-1990s through the interaction of transnational "soft
law" with more conventional legal forms at the countiy level. While
intemational economic agencies have played a major role in this process
we find that they in tum have been influenced by government practices in
certain developed countries, notably New Zealand.
The normative
underpinning of these codes is often obscured by the neutral, procedural
language of fiscal transparency. We also draw attention to the efforts of
certain NGOs to reformulate budget transparency norms to advance an
alternative fiscal politics in which values of social equality and democratic
legitimacy are more heavily weighted.
A . INTERNATIONAL LEVEL INITIATIVES

1. THE IMF
In previous work Miranda Stewart has documented the rising
influence of international financial institutions and their affiliated experts
over domestic tax reform agendas, especially but not only in developing
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countries.''' A similar pattem of transfer from the intemational to the
domestic level is clearly evident in the spread of fiscal transparency
norms, and the IMF has taken the lead role in this process.
The IMF's work on fiscal transparency evolved directly out of its
efforts to promote budget discipline as a cornerstone of worldwide
economic policy. For borrower countries, reduction or elimination of
deficit financing has been a key element of IMF conditionality. A review
of IMF-supported fiscal reforms during the 1990s indicates that reduction
of government expenditures, downsizing of the state, shifting of
expenditures from current to capital account and some provision of safety
net or pro-developing expenditures were key elements of IMF-funded
r e f o r m s . B y 1996 however the IMF had begun to stress that reforms to
promote good govemance, the mle of law, and public sector accountability
were also needed in many countries to create the conditions for success of
its economic policy prescriptions.'''^
At this early stage of the govemance revolution the IMF advocated
fiscal transparency primarily as a means of shoring up fiscal discipline and
improving a country"s credibility with private investors. A critical 1996
Declaration restated the IMF"s longstanding view that countries should
aim for "...budget balance and strengthened fiscal discipline in a multiyear framework" and added:
Continued fiscal imbalances and excessive public
^' Stewart, above n 27; Stewart and Jogarajan, above n 27; Miranda Stewart, "Tax Policy
Transfer to Developing Countries: Politics, Institutions and Experts" in Holger Nehring
and Florian Schui (eds). Global Debates About Taxation (2007) 182. See also Art
Cockfield, Allison Christians on the OECD.
George T Abed et al, "Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries: Experience Under
IMF-Supported Programs" (Occasional Paper No 160, International Monetaiy Fund,
1998), 4 and Part \W. And see Schick, "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting", above n
16, 8.
See Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetaiy Fund,
"Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth: Interim Committee Declaration" (Press
Release No 96/49, International Monetaiy Fund, 29 September 1996); and The Role of
the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note (1997) International Monetaiy Fund
<http://wwwJmf.org/externcd/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govern.pdf>
at 24 September 2008 ,
especially at 3-4 where issues of budget process and management are identified as central
to the IMF"s mandate and expertise.
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indebtedness, and the upward pressures they put
on global real interest rates, are threats to financial
stability and durable growth. It is essential to
enhance the transparency of fiscal policy by
persevering with efforts to reduce off-budget
transactions and quasi-fiscal deficits.^'*
The link between transparency and fiscal restraint was further
emphasized in an influential study paper by two senior members of the
IMF Fiscal Affairs Department:
Timely publication of a clearly presented budget
document makes it easier for the market to
evaluate the govemmenf's intentions and allows
the market itself to impose a constmctive
discipline on the government. Transparency
increases the political risk of unsustainable
policies, whereas the lack thereof means that fiscal
profligacy can go undetected longer than it
otherwise would.''^
Initially the IMF sought to encourage fiscal transparency simply by
incorporating govemance concems into its existing programs of countiy
suiYcillance, technical advice, and loan conditionality.''^ In canying out
these long-standing functions IMF staff were now to impress upon country
authorities the "potential risk that poor govemance could adversely affect
market confidence and, in turn, reduce private capital in-flows and
investment."^' In 1997 the IMF moved to formahze its guidance on fiscal
transparency in a detailed set of standards. This decision flowed directly
from the Asian financial crisis and the sense of urgency it created about
restoring market confidence.^^ At a meeting in October 1997 Executive
Directors debated the merits of having staff prepare a "brief manual of

Kopits and Craig, above n 21, 2.
The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues, above n 33, 6-9.
" Ibid 7.
See Murray Petrie, "The IMF Fiscal Transparency Code: A Potentially Powerfiil New
Anti-Corruption Tool" (Paper presented at the 9"' International Anti-Corruption
Conference, Durban, 10-15 October 1999), 2-3.
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good practices for fiscal transparency."
While the report of this
discussion indicates that some Directors had reservations, staff were
instructed to proceed and the IMF"s frrst Code of Good Practices on
Fiscal Transparency was approved in April 1998.''^ Revised versions of
the IMF Code were published in 2 0 0 1 and 2007, along with an extensive
manual which provides detailed guidance to assist with "practical
implementation" .'^'
On publishing its first Code in 1998 the IMF stated the purposes of
fiscal transparency more broadly than in earlier documents:
The underlying rationale was that fiscal
transparency could lead to better informed public
debate about the design and results of fiscal policy,
make govemments more accountable for the
implementation of fiscal policy, and thereby
promote good govemance, strengthen credibility,
and mobilize popular support for sound
macroeconomic policies.''^
The IMF's interest in promoting public debate must be read
skeptically, we argue, in light of its fimdamental policy orientation toward
fiscal discipline. Its early discussions of transparency show that the driving
purpose was not to facilitate more informed and inclusive political
bargaining over budgetary decisions, but rather to help ensure that
countries would stick to an IMF-approved set of fiscal policies even in the

"Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1998",
above n 21, Ch. 6, at 40.
Ibid.; and Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetaiy
Fimd, (Communique, International Monetary Fund, 16 April 1998).
How Does the IMF Encourage Greater Fiscal Transparency? (2008) International
Monetary Fund <http://w\vw.imf org/external/np/exr/facts/fiscal.httn> at 25 September
2008; and IMF Manual (2007), above n I . See also Fiscal Affairs Department, Guide on
Resource
Revenue
Transparency
(2007)
International
Monetaiy
Fund,
<http://www.imforg/external/np/pp/2007/eng/101907g.pdfi> at 10 October 2008.
' ' "Annual Report of the Executive Board for the Financial Year Ended April 30, 1998",
above n 21, Ch. VI, at 40.
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face of domestic political protest.
The resolution approving the 1998 Code noted that it "does not
imply a legal obligation on members."'*'* Nonetheless, the IMF has taken
concerted steps to encourage compliance. As a result, we argue, the Code
now exerts significant normative pressure on policy makers in many
countries. The IMF's main implementation vehicle is the so-called fiscal
ROSC, referring to a special module added to the Report on Observance of
Standards and Codes which is used by the IMF to evaluate country
compliance with fiscal norms. For example, in its 2001 fiscal ROSC on
Brazil the IMF commented favourably on the country's improved fiscal
management and noted that "the cornerstone of these achievements has
been the enactment in May 2000 of a Fiscal Responsibility Law which sets
out for all levels of govemment fiscal rales designed to ensure mediumterm fiscal sustainability, and strict transparency requirements to underpin
the effectiveness and credibility of such rales." ^ Fiscal ROSCs are
formally voluntary as countries must request an assessment by the IMF,
and they are published only by consent.'*^ While many developed countries
have undergone the process, take up has been especially strong among
developing countries seeking better capital market access, in part because
the IMF"s published reports are used by credit rating agencies and private
analysts to gauge investment risk.'*' Moreover the IMF indicates it has
sometimes incorporated the recommendations of fiscal ROSCs into loan
For example in their leading paper on fiscal transparency Kopits and Craig explained
its role in quelling popular protest as follows: "Although fiscal transparency cannot
guarantee consensus, there have been episodes (including recent ones) where a failure to
prepare the population, through adequate and candid explanation, for the removal of a
critical subsidy or a labor market regulation has led to major unrest and jeopardized the
improved economic performance sought by those measures", above n 21, 2.
Interim Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetaiy Fund,
above n 40.
' ' Fiscal Affairs Department, "Brazil: Report on Obsei-vance of Standards and Codes
(ROSC)-Fiscal Transparency Module" (Countiy Report No 01/217, International
Monetary Fund, 2001), 1.
By 2003 the IMF reported that 54 fiscal ROSCs had been completed ofwhich 48 were
published on its website: Fiscal Affairs Department, "Assessing and Promoting Fiscal
Transparency: A Report on Progress" (International Monetary Fund, 2003), 4. A more
recent document indicates that by Januaiy 2008, 90 countries from all regions and levels
of development had consented to publication of fiscal ROSCs: How Does the lA'IF
Encourage Greater Fiscal Transparency?, above n 41.
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conditionality for particular countries. One example is Argentina, where
a new Fiscal Responsibility Law was enacted in 2 0 0 4 as a direct response
to IMF requirements for institutional reform.'*^ The decision to undergo or
comply with the results of a fiscal ROSC cannot be seen as equally
voluntary for all countries.
Globally, it is our view that the IMF Code is the dominant model,
and it has had pervasive influence via several channels. The normtransmitting capacity of the IMF Code has been magnified by the work of
other transnational players, in both the public and private sectors. This
includes the World Bank which has sometimes collaborated with the IMF
in completing fiscal ROSC reports or has relied on them in its own work
in particular in developing aid and loan expenditure accountability
mechanisms (see further below).^° The Code has also been promoted by
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), a group comprised of financial
regulators from several developed countries plus international financial
institutions and standard-setting bodies including the IMF.^' The FSF has
urged "market practitioners to take...account, when making lending and
investment decisions, of jurisdictions" observance of standards. "^^ Private
sector investment analysts do appear to use the Code in this manner, both
by relying on IMF reports of country compliance, and by applying the
Code independently to evaluate fiscal transparency in countries for which

Ibid, para 19.
' ' See Braun and Gadano (2007), above n 21, 60-62.
'" See International Bank for Reconstmction and Development and International
Monetary Fund, "Bank / Fund Collaboration on Public Expenditure Issues" (Board
Report No 25763, World Bank, 2003), especially at 20. World Bank analysts have also
used the IMF Code, above n 1, as a benchmark for evaluating budget processes in
developed and developing countries: see for example Zhicheng Li Swift, "Managing the
Effects of Tax Expenditures on National Budgets" (Policy Research Working Paper No
WPS3927, World Bank, 2006), 26-27; Note also endorsement by G7 Finance Ministers in
1999.
^' Financial StabiHty Fomm, <http://www.fsfoi-um.org> at 10 October 2008. Among
other recent activities the FSF presented the following report: Mario Draghi, "Update on
the Implementation of the FSF"s Recommendations: Report by the FSF Chairman to the
G8 Finance Ministers" (Financial Stability Forum, 2008).
' ' FoUow-Up Group on Incentives to Foster Implementation of Standards, "Report for the
meeting of the FSF on 6/7 September 2001" (Financial Stability Forum, 2001).
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no fiscal ROSC is available. Further, there is some evidence the Code is
influencing the way donor countries deliver foreign aid. For example the
UK"s Department for Intemational Development uses the IMF Code along
with other intemational standards to help it assess the risks of delivering
aid directly through a govemmenf's central budget, as contrasted with aid
that is tied to specific projects or administered by NGOs.^'* The prospect of
securing less conditional forms of intemational aid thus provides another
impetus for developing countries to adopt IMF-defined fiscal transparency
norms into their domestic law and practice.
2. THE OECD
Following the IMF"s lead, the OECD began work in 1999 on a set
of Best Practices for Budget Transparency, (the OECD Practices) gleaned
from the experience of member countries .^^ The active involvement of
both the IMF and the OECD indicates the global sweep of fiscal
transparency norms, encompassing developed and developing nations
alike. As explained in Part 2, like the IMF, the OECD"s interest in this
subject is firmly rooted in its concems about the pmdence and
sustainability of fiscal policy within its membership. Though many OECD
countries reduced their large deficits during the 1990s, budget balances are
thought to be at risk in future due to spending pressures associated with
demographic aging, including health care and pensions.^'' The OECD has
predicted that the fiscal consequences of this trend will be "severe" in
virtually all its member countries.^' From its perspective the main purpose
of transparency measures is to encourage spending restraint by revealing
Ibid para 32. See also Murray Petrie, "Promoting Fiscal Transparency: The
Complementary Roles of the IMF, Financial Markets and Civil Society" (Working Paper
No 03/199, International Monetary Fund, 2003), 8.
' ' See Department for International Development, Managing Fiduciary Risk Wlien
Providing Direct Budget Support (U.K., March 2002), at 8-10. See also Noi-wegian
Agency for Development Coordination, Coordination of Budget Support Programmes:
Lessons from the Joint Macro-Financial Aid Programme to Mosambique (Report
2001/l)(online
at
http://www.norad.nO/item.s/1128/38/2574038865/0101coordination%20ot%20budget%20
support.pdf). at 5.
" OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, above n 1,3.
' ' See for example OECD, "Fiscal Sustainability: The Contribution of Fiscal Rules",
above n 21, 117.
" Joumard et al, above n 19, 117-118.
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"the trae cost of government activities."
In publishing its Practices the O E C D took care to note that they
"are not meant to constitute a formal 'standard' for budget
transparency."^' The O E C D is not a fimding body and does not have the
same types of leverage over its members as the IMF, in the sense of
imposing conditions on financial assistance. Nor does the O E C D formally
report on country compliance with its Practices. Nonetheless, one of the
purposes of the document is clearly to encourage reform and convergence
at the country level: "[t]he Best Practices are designed as a reference tool
for Member and non-member countiues to use in order to increase the
degree of budget transparency in their respective countries."^" Since 2003
the O E C D has also engaged in a major research endeavour to collect
detailed information about budget practices in member and selected nonmember countries, through a questionnaire which covers many of the
aspects of transparency addressed in its Practices.^' The findings of this
research are made public as a free electronic database which has been used
by academics to compare and rank the fiscal transparency of different
countries.While it is difficult to measure the extent to which domestic
policy makers, investment analysts, or other players are influenced by
these rankings, their existence suggests that the O E C D functions as
another informal regulator of budgeting norms, though it plays a less
directive role than the IMF.
The O E C D focus on budget transparency is one element of its
overall approach to globally coordinated government policy for

'* Ibid 127.
' ' OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, above n I , 3.
•^"Ibid.
^' The most recent version is OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Sutvey (online at
http://wwvv.oecd.org/dataoecd/3Q/45/39466141 .pdf). Interestingly, while the sui"vey
includes questions about any substantive fiscal rales applicable in the jurisdiction (such
as spending caps or balanced budget rales), it does not ask whether a countiy has enacted
fiscal transparency legislation: see especially question 14.
The database was most recently updated in 2007 and can be accessed at
http://webnet4.oecd.org/budgeting/Budgeting.aspx. For rankings based on the database
see for example James E Alt and David Dreyer Lassen, "Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal
Policy Outcomes in OECD Countries" (Economic Policy Research Unit at the University
of Copenhagen, 2003-02); Bastida and Benito, above n 3.
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investment in its PoUcy Framework for Investment. Chapter 5 of the
Policy Framework concems tax policy and Chapter 10 concerns public
govemance. Clearly the emphasis is on the impact of law and policy on
investors and in neither chapter is much emphasis placed on the budget
process itself However, Item 5.7 refers to the need for tax expenditure
accounts and sunset clauses to "inform and manage the budget process"
and Chapter 10 refers in general terms to the need for "public consultation
mechanisms and procedures" (Item 10.4); the use of "regulatory impact
assessments" (Item 10.3); "a coherent and comprehensive regulatory
reform framework" (Item 10.1); and the application of anti-cormption
laws and the ability for "civil society organisations and the media" to
scratinise the conduct of public officials (Item 10.7).
3. NGOs
The concept of "transparency" has a venerable history among
NGOs, in particular with a focus on coiruption, such as the famous group
Transparency Intemational. Several non-govemmental actors are making
efforts at the international level to encourage and assess budget
transparency in different countries. Perhaps the most prominent is the
Intemational Budget Project (IBP) of the Centre on Budget and Policy
Priorities, based in Washington, D.C In a study on who uses the IMF
Code, Petrie reported that civil society organizations generally found it
inadequate for their purposes and thus had developed their own modified
standards.^'* For example in the late 1990s the IBP worked with the
Institute for Democracy and Accountability in South Africa (IDASA) to
formulate an alternative budget transparency questionnaire for use in
South Africa and later several other African countries.The authors of the
fmal report offered as a rationale for the study that, "in the context of
widespread poveity in the developing world, citizens and civil society
organisations are increasingly focusing on the budget and its effects on the
distribution of resources, leading them to demand more and better budget
information."^*' Contrasting this explanation with the IMF and OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PoUcy Framework for
Investment (2006).
'''' Petrie, "Promoting Fiscal Transparency", above n 53.
' ' Folscher, Krafchik and Shapiro, above n 2. Also cite ICi-afchik historical review of
lBP"s budget transparency work.
Ibid 3.
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emphasis on fiscal discipline and credibility demonstrates the range of
different meanings and goals that can be attached to the concept of fiscal
transparency. These different visions are also reflected in the specific
criteria used to measure transparency at the country level, the subject of
Part 3 below.
The IBP also helped to initiate a comparative study of budget
transparency in five Latin American countries.^' The study was designed
and carried out by civil society groups and academics based in Latin
America, and employed both a survey of expert participants in the budget
process and a separate study of the legal framework for budgeting in each
country. This methodology was chosen in order to assess "whether the
lack of transparency is due to legal gaps or a deficient application of
budget legislation."*'^
Since the release of these regional studies, the IBP has launched its
Open Budget Index (the "IBP Index") based on the work of associate
researchers in dozens of countries who applied a transparency
questionnaire to assess their govemments" performance and determine a
ranking.^' The IBP Index is the most ambitious exercise to date and has
examined budgeting practices in 59 countries thi'ough lengthy
questionnaires administered by independent academic or civil society
researchers in each country.
It would be a mistake to treat NGO work on fiscal transparency as
entirely separate and distinct from that of the intemational financial
institutions. Certainly, the NGO focus on empowering local civil society
groups to engage with the budget process means they are less preoccupied

Index of Budget Transparency in Five Latin American Coimtries: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Mexico and Peru (2001) Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
<http://www.internationalbudget.org/resources/LAbudtrans.pdf> at 22 September 2008.
' ' Ibid 1. [Note for Part 3: The researchers found that while laws regulating the budget
process existed in the region, they did not include mechanisms to promote citizen
participation (at 2)]
' ' The International Budget Project Open Budget Initiative (Washington, D.C: Center on
Budget
and
Pohcy
Priorities,
2006),
online
at
http://www.onenbudRetindex.org/SummaryRei')oit.pdf. This report and many resources
on budget transparency projects worldwide are available at www.internationalbudget.org.
The results were unveiled on October 18, 2006.
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than the IMF or OECD with issues of economic stability and growth.
However, the IBP does not present itself as opposing the IMF"s fiscal
transparency campaign but rather supplementing it with additional
research and activism. The IBP is eager to point out that a consensus in
favour of transparency crosses a range of interests:
.. .the idea of promoting open budgets is one that
can gather support from a wide range of actors,
leading to a coalition not available on other
issues. Business interests often favor open budgets
because they provide a better understood context
in which to invest. Intemational organizations
support them because they feel open budgets are
essential to good governance. Civil society
organizations favor open budgets reflecting their
general support of more open and democratic
societies.
Govemments fmd them hard to
70

Oppose.

Thus, the IBP has lauded the IMF Code and has portrayed the work
of the two organizations as "complementary" because "[ijndependent
researchers and the IMF have access to different infomiation and target
different audiences."" IMF staff have participated in conferences of the
IBP, and its Code has served as a starting point for IBP work. One the
other side, there is some evidence that IMF persomiel have begun to place
some stock in the IBP's findings about transparency in particular countries
and to incorporate them into its analyses.'^ These interweavings
complicate the pattern of norm development at the transnational level, as
they suggest a significant degree of collaboration between different policy
networks or epistemic communities.
' International Budget Partnership, above n 2, "Why Focus on Budget Transparency and
Participation".
" Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), "Transparency and Participation in
the Budget Process: The South African Case Report" (Paper presented at the Second
Conference of the International Budget Project, Cape Town, Februaiy 1999), 3 (cited in
Petrie, "The IMF Fiscal Transparency Code", above n 38, 9.
' ' See for example Taryn Parry, "The Role of Fiscal Transparency in Sustaining Stability
and Growth in Latin America " (Working Paper No 07/220, International Monetary Fund,
2007), where she includes data from the Open Budget Index.
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4. A I D DONORS, THE WORLD B A N K AND EXPENDITURE MANAGEMENT

Budget transparency and accountability also concems aid donor
country governments in their capacity as donors. As identified recently by
the OECD, donors and the World Bank have put significant effort into
strengthening and managing accountability for aid and project expenditure
and much less into budgeting in general, or tax policy and
administration.''' Several avenues have been developed by country donors
to strengthen and help manage public finances and fiscal policy in aid
recipient countries.
First, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process
associated with conditional lending and debt relief comprises the central
means by which the IMF and World Bank seek to consult with developing
country governments, the poor and other stakeholders in respect of
expenditures, reforms and policy generally. More than 70 PRSPs had been
completed by countries borrowing from the IMF and World Bank as at
March 2008. They are lengthy documents, mnning to several hundred
pages. The key goals of PRSPs are stated to be to strengthen country
ownership of refoim programs, enhance the poverty focus of programs and
provide for stronger collaboration between the institutions, recipient
countries and other development lenders and donors.''*
Second, the OECD jointly with the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC), which is the peak body for donor countries, has begun
to monitor aid effectiveness and in 2005 established a program to monitor
the use of harmonised standards to assess public financial management in
aid recipient countries; to provide training and share experiences; and to
establish harmonised accounting standards for aid recipient countries
reporting on external assistance.'^

" OECD (2008), p. 27
Independent Evaluation Office, "Evaluation of the IMF"s Role in Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers and The Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility" (International
Monetaiy Fund, 2004), 14.
'^ Development Cooperation Directorate of the DAC, Public Financial Management; this
followed the "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness" (High-Level Fomm on Joint
Progress Toward Enhanced Aid Effectiveness, 2 March 2005), an international
agreement to which over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior
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That monitoring process builds on the Public Expenditure and
Financial Accountability (PEFA) program fwww.pefa.org) established in
2001 and is jointly financed by the World Bank (using its Development
Grant Facility), the European Commission, the UK (through its
Department for Intemational Development), Switzerland, Norway, France
and the IMF. PEFA has the goal of strengthening both "recipient and
donor ability" to assess the condition of (presumably recipient) country
public expenditure, procurement and financial accountability systems,
generally termed Public Financial Management (PFM) and to develop
reforms and capacity-building in this area.
The PEFA framework replaces the previous Highly Indebted Poor
Country framework for country public financial assessment (so as to
qualify countries for debt relief under that program) and is being used by
the UK and some other countries in their own donor assessments of
countries. PEFA claims strong support for its Framework for assessing
pubhc financial management and suggests that the Framework is likely to
be sustainable into the future because, among other things, of
(i) its wide support from intemational agencies
(the members of the OECD DAC joint venture on
PFM), (ii) its fast, global adoption, despite the
decentralized (country based) decision-making on
if and when to use the Framework, [and] (iii) the
agreement to implement repeat assessments in
many countries...'*^
One issue that has been widely aired over the last decade about
reforms implemented in donor and lender-dominated processes, has been
concerns about a lack of country "ownership" of the refoim. Ten years
ago, this was described in relation to conditionality-hnked loan facilities of

Officials adhered and committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase
efforts in haimonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable
actions and indicators.
' ' Public Expenditure & Financial Accountability, Frequently Asked
<http://www.pefa.org/faqmn.php> at 3 October 2008, answer to question 1.3.
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the IMF as follows:''
The one common theme that runs through
perceptions of [the Enhanced
Structural
Adjustment Facility] is a feeling of a loss of
control over the policy content and the pace of
implementation of reform ... there is broad
agreement that ownership is a necessary condition
of successful policy reform.
PEFA states that it aims for a significant level of "country
ownership" of expenditure management pohcy and systems, to reduce
transaction costs for aid recipient and donor countries, to increase donor
harmonisation (fragmentation of aid is described as a very significant
complicating factor for recipient countiy budget processes). While
separate from the fiscal transparency and budget assessment processes,
with a particular focus on expenditure and tracking of aid funds (and debt
relief benefits), a key reason for development of the PEFA Framework has
been increased attention to country ownership and the move to include aid
funds in a govemment budget rather than off budget.'^
Budget support requires negotiation by donors with a government
about the overall budget expenditure process and administration thi-ough
governmental mechanisms, in contrast to direct aid-to-project processes
which are administered and fimded in communities directly by extemal
agencies or non-government organisations. Most aid is provided directly
on a project basis and hence is off-budget. This presents real challenges
for countries seeking to enhance budget transparency and accountability
and also receiving large aid inflows, in particular as these can be volatile
and uncertain, unless there is a mechanism for centrally tracking all aid
disbursements. The World Bank has begun to take the view that a
country's own budget process is "the central institutional framework for
exercising choices on where resources should be channelled and for

Kwesi Botchwey et al, "Report of the Group of Independent Persons Appointed to
Conduct an Evaluation of Certain Aspects of the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility" (International Monetary Fund, 1998), Part 2, 20.
Stefan ICoeberle, Zoran Stavreski and Jan Walliser (eds). Budget Support as More
Effective Aid? Recent Experiences and Emerging Lessons (2006).
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holding govemments accountable". The European Commission and
World Bank aim to provide 30% of aid through budget support in the
longer term.
Concems associated with budget support as the mechanism for aid
provision include fiduciary risk where financial management in a country
is weak (especially, the risk that aid will be misappropriated), increased
transaction costs for donors and a strain on the capacity of the ministry of
finance as the main coordinator of a variety of development priorities but
the "emerging consensus among donors is that budget support is an
approach better suited to countries with a good track record and ...
transparent budget management".^'
The PEFA Framework overlaps with the IMF Fiscal ROSC
process and with budget transparency norms. PEFA explains this as
foUows:^^
... The mobilization and utilization of financial
resources for the public is a most essential part of
govemance.
Where
transparency
and
accountability mechanisms are weak or lacking,
poor people"s needs are often marginalized and
development outcomes suffer. Several PFM
analytical tools can help to promote transparency
through publication of their findings, including in
a PFM Performance Report. However, monitoring
is key to accountability... The PEFA Framework
can therefore provide an important part of a
monitoring framework for govemance.
5. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY: BINDING INTERNATIONAL FISCAL RULES

Our final example of fiscal nomr creation at an international level
Koeberle, Stefan and Stavreslci, Zoran, "Budget Support: Concepts and Issues" in
Koeberle et al (eds), ibid 3, 4.
'" For a detailed discussion of recent experiences and issues see Koeberle et al (eds),
above n 78.
' ' Ibid 12.
' ' PEFA, above n 76, answer to question 1.2.
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is tliat of the creation of a "hard" fiscal rule among member states in the
European Union who are signatories of the Maastiicht Stability and
Growth Pact, established in the euro currency area to stabilize and support
the currency union.^'' The Pact requires that member states limit annual
govemment deficits to a reference level of 3 percent of GDP; govemment
debt is be limited to 60 percent of GDP.
The Pact is clearly of importance in any discussion of fiscal
transparency or responsibility rales because of its establishment of an
apparently binding fiscal rale at an intemational level and the consequent
very high level of intemational coordination of economic policy required
in the European Union. Under Article 104 of the Treaty, a set of
consequences ensue for member states which breach this requirement,
escalating from completion of a confidential Commission report, through a
Council recommendation, publicity requirements, up to constraints on
borrowing from the European Investment Bank, a requirement of a deposit
with the Community or fines. For our puiposes, however, the most
interesting element of this binding rale is the procedural norms, data
release, govemmental accountability and acquiescence to economic
surveillance required under the Pact and laid down in a range of
Resolutions, Codes of Conduct and ECOFIN Council conclusions and
recommendations.^'* These norms dominate the actual implementation of
the fiscal rale. The Council of the European Union uses these procedures
as its framework for conditioning increasing transparency, medium-term
budgeting frameworks and expenditure management processes within the
member states. This is illustrated by the ECOFIN Council Ministerial
conclusions in 2007 in which they agreed "that ensuring progress towards
The Maastricht Treaty (establishing the European Community) establishes a framework
in Part 3 Title 7 under which member states "shall regard their economic policies as a
matter of common concern" (Article 99.1) and hence submit themselves to "multilateral
surveillance" by the European Commission and through it, by each other (Article 99.3).
More particularly, member states shall "avoid excessive government deficits" as
determined by the reference ratio of 3 percent for the deficit to GDP: Article 104 and the
Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure annexed to the Treaty: accessed at
http://ec.eiiropa.eii/economv_finance/other_pages/other pages 12638 en.htm 9 October
2008. While the specific deficit procedures in Article 104 do not apply to countries that
are not euro members (such as the UK), the surveillance procedures are applied to all
European Union member states.
' ' http://ec.europa.en/economv finance/other pages/other pages 12638 en.htm accessed
9 October 2008.
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sustainable fiscal positions is a key priority, in line with the preventive
arm of the Stability and Growth Pacf .^^ The Council emphasised:
All countries not yet at their medium-term
objective (MTO), should speed up the pace of
deficit and debt reduction and allocate higher-thanexpected revenues to this objective. ...
Recalhng their conclusions of October 2006,
Ministers confirmed the importance of national
fiscal rules and institutions, including monitoring
mechanisms, in the attainment of sound budgetary
positions. In particular, they acknowledged that
rules-based multiaimual fiscal frameworks at
national level could help to ensure adherence to
medium-teiin budgetary plans, including by
controlhng expenditure. In line with the Code of
Conduct,
information
on national fiscal
frameworks and relevant innovations in national
rules and institutions should continue to be
reported in the annual updates of the Stability and
Convergence Programmes (SCPs).
As an afterthought, the Ministers "recan[ed] the importance of
domestic ownership, including the appropriate involvement of national
Parliaments". The true audience, however, for these significant
"transparency" obligations is the Commission and the Council of the EU;
the finance ministers and economic policy-makers of the other member
states; and financial markets.
B . COUNTRY LEVEL INITIATIVES

In this section we shift the focus to the domestic level by charting
the adoption of budget-related legislation in selected countries, seeking to
ECOFIN Council Press Release (October 2007), Conclusions on improving the
effectiveness
of
the
stability
and
Growth
Pact,
http://ec.europa.eu/economvfinance/abQut/activilies/sgii/council-october-2007en.pdf
accessed 9 October 2008.
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uncover the historical process of norm creation and transfer.
1. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, AND THE U.K.

The experience of these three countries is critical because it shows
that ideas about fiscal transparency have not only migrated from the
transnational to the domestic level, but also in the reverse direction. A l l
three (Anglophone) countries rank above the average in a recent study of
country compliance with O E C D Practices, with New Zealand "far and
away" the best performing country.^^ As we shall see, that may be because
the O E C D Practices follow the New Zealand design. Australia ranks
highly on integrity, control and accountability but less highly on budget
reports and specific disclosures according to this study, while the United
Kingdom ranlcs high on disclosures and accountability but very low on
budget reports, (a poor mark which brings its average dowii).^'
New Zealand pioneered the design of budget transparency
legislation with its Fiscal Responsibility Act 1994, a move that predated all
of the international fiscal transparency codes discussed above. This Act
was highly iimovative in that it sought to tighten fiscal discipline not
through hard fiscal caps, but through procedural rules that stressed
transparency.^^ It caught the attention of fiscal policy analysts in the
intemational agencies and the New Zealand model quickly became a
"benchmark" for defining fiscal transparency.^'
Australia and the UK followed by enacting comparable statutes in
Bastida and Benito, above n 3, Figure I on p. 680 and Figure 4 on pp. 684-5. We
consider tlie results of this study (one of the few comparative studies made to date) to be
interesting but with significant limitations, including that it is based on country selfreporting through an OECD questionnaire process; and that it does not examine actiral
practice but the legal and administrative procedures in place.
" Ibid Figure 4 on pp. 684-5.
' ' See Angela Barnes and Steve Leith, "Budget Management That Counts: Recent
Approaches to Budget and Fiscal Management in New Zealand", Treasuiy Working
Paper 01/24 (New Zealand Treasury Department, 2001); and Jon Janssen, "New
Zealand"s Fiscal Policy Framework: Experience and Evolution", Treasury Working
Paper 01/25 (New Zealand Treasuiy Department, 2001). [also get Graham C. Scott,
"Government Reform in New Zealand" (IMF 1996); and C. Mangiano, "Accountability
and Transparency in the Public Sector - The New Zealand Experience" (IMF 1996)].
See Kopits and Craig, above n 21, Chapter 3.
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1998, the same year the IMF approved its first Code. A l l three
govemments eschewed strict numerical limits in favour of procedural mles
that mandated disclosure of the government's fiscal policy agenda and
actual resuhs on an ongoing basis. The experience of these nations
influenced the development and enforcement of fiscal transparency
standards by the IMF and OECD.
For example, Australia took an early leadership role by conducting
a detailed analysis of its own compliance with the IMF Code shortly after
its adoption in 1998. IMF staff participated as independent reviewers of
the draft report. The stated purpose of the whole exercise was to
"contribute to intemational financial reform" by "preparing a selfassessment report, providing a format and methodology that other
countries may choose to follow."'' Austraha's Charter of Budget Honesty
emphasises publication of fiscal strategies, outlook and performance
reports, and a long-term intergenerational report. Australia is said to have
pioneered the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) using
multi-year forward estimates as the starting point for considering
govemmental department bids for resources from the budget, within the
overall resource framework set by the government.'^ However, notably,
this is not contained in the Charter but is a matter of institutional practice.
The Budget is to be managed in accordance with "pmdent" fiscal
93

practice.
The UK govemment's Code for Fiscal Stability was approved by
the Parliament under section 155(7) of the Finance Act 1998.''^ New
Zealand's example, and the IMF work on budget transparency both appear
Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 (Cth); The Code for Fiscal Stability (1998) Her
Majesty"s Treasury <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.Uk/media/2/9/fiscaI_stability.pdf> at
10 October 2008.
" Commonwealth of Australia, Making Transparency Transparent: An Australian
Assessment
(March
1999),
at
5-7
(online
at
http://www.treasuiy.gov.au/contentitem.asp?NavId=016&ContentID=178).
Schick, "The Role of Fiscal Rules in Budgeting", above n 16, 18.
Charter, cl. 5.
The EU Stability and Growth Pact was also being developed at this time; Although the
UK did not join the euro currency area (and hence is not required to adhere to the strict
budgetary deficit rales established under the Maastricht Treaty), as a member of the EU it
monitors its compliance with the European Pact.
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to have been important influences. However, perhaps most important was
the goal of "signalling a commitment to sensible management of the
public finances" by the new Labour government.'^ Chancellor Gordon
Brown stated that the Code was intended to strengthen the openness,
transparency, accountability and "credibility" of fiscal policy.'^ The UK
Code does not impose explicit fiscal caps but operates together with two
non-binding, "conventional" budget principles that are outside the Code.
These are the "golden rule" (which states that the current budget surplus
must be at least zero, or rather, there should not be a deficit, over an
economic cycle) and the "sustainable investment" rule that requires that
net debt will be maintained below 4 0 percent of GDP in an economic
cycle.
The role of New Zealand especially suggests that fiscal
transparency norms did not simply emerge from within the IMF, but were
formed by a broader epistemic community that included policy makers in
certain key developed countries. However once a blueprint was codified at
the international level, the IMF and OECD began using it to assess the
budget institutions and practices of many other countries facing a wide
range of different economic development challenges. As Rodrik observes,
the use of such blueprints may be beneficial in enabling an efficient
process of reform, but also carries risks i f it overshadows local political
processes that ensure local ownership and effective design and
implementation of refoiTns." In particular, attempts to reform the public
financial management systems of developing countries by simply
transplanting advanced country best practices have often failed, according
to Stevens. Too often such reforms do not jibe with the informal culture
and traditions around which governance has stabilized in the host country,
or they require too much support from external consultants to be sustained
over the long term.'^

See discussion in Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10, 6. The Labour Party under
Blair and Gordon Brown was elected in a landsHde victoiy in 1997.
'' The Code for Fiscal Stability, above n 90; Her Majesty"s Treasury, "Chancellor
Proposes Code for Fiscal Stability" (Pre-Budget Report 1997: Press Notice No HMT 2,
25 November 1997).
" Dani Rodrik, One Economics, Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and
Economic Growth (2007), 164-5
Stevens, above n 9, 1-4.
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2. DEVELOPING AND EMERGING COUNTRIES: NIGERIA, PAKISTAN, INDIA
AND SOUTH AFRICA

Moves towards establishment or reform of budget laws and fiscal
frameworks were also begun in many developing and emerging countries
during the last decade. Some countries adopted these laws at least in part
influenced by the policy directions of the IMF, either through
conditionality-linked borrowing or as part of the general surveillance
process carried out by the IMF, including through a fiscal ROSC. In other
countries, in particular emerging economies and strong democracies
including South Africa and India, a different path has been taken towards
establishment of fiscal transparency laws, with some different outcomes in
both content and impact of these laws.
IMF-linked reforms
Pakistan: In 2 0 0 0 the IMF lamented in a review of Pakistan's fiscal
regime that "[t]he current legal framework does not make specific
provision for reporting on performance or reporting to parliament or the
public beyond the annual budget and amiual accounts presentations."'' It
recommended that Pakistan consider "developing a Public Finance
Act...giving exphcit emphasis to performance and fiscal transparency."""'
Three years later, following a teclmical advice mission to Pakistan, the
IMF reported that the country had made progress on transparency through
several steps including "preparation of a draft fiscal responsibihty law."""
Pakistan's Parliament subsequently enacted the Fiscal Responsibility and
Debt Limitation Act, 2005 which includes both substantive fiscal targets
and transparency provisions requiring government to make regular reports
to the National Assembly.'"^ While domestic politics were no doubt also at
Fiscal Affairs Department, "Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC):
Pakistan-I. Fiscal Transparency" (Intemational Monetaiy Fund, 2000), para. 13.
Ibid para 38.
Fiscal Affairs Department, "Assessing and Promoting Fiscal Transparency", above n
46, 13. Other reports urging or praising the adoption of fiscal transparency legislation at
the countiy level include Fiscal Affairs Department, "United States: Report on the
Obsei-vance of Standards and Codes-Fiscal Transparency Module" (Country Report No
03/243, International Monetaiy Fund, 2003), 33-34; .. ..[add more references].
Act. No. V I of 2005 received the assent of the President on June 13, 2005 (Gazette of
Pakistan, June 20, 2005).
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play in bringing about this law reform, the IMF's involvement through its
fiscal ROSC process is clearly evident. In this sense, Pakistan's legislation
can be viewed as a hard law manifestation of soft law promulgated at the
transnational level.
Nigeria: There is no published IMF fiscal ROSC available for
Nigeria. Transparency and corruption have been and remain enormous
problems in this country, in particular in relation to oil extraction.
Although Nigeria has managed to pay down its international creditors and
does not borrow from the IMF, domestic tensions about oil projects
remain high. However, in the last few years there have been some
developments relating to transparency including the Fiscal Responsibility
Act, introduced in 2 0 0 4 by Finance Minister Ngolzi Okonjo-Iweala, which
was finally approved by the National Assembly and signed into law in late
2007 after being stalled for years in Parliament.'"^
Although not publicly engaged with the IMF, Nigeria"s massive
oil wealth has finally led to significant attention being been paid to
transparency of resource revenues. The Nigeria Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative report prepared by an international auditor was
published in April 2 0 0 6 and Nigeria also entered into a Policy Support
Instrument with the IMF in October, 2005 (this ended in 2007, around the
same time that the Fiscal Responsibility Bill received Parliamentaiy
approval). This Instrament is described by the IMF as a purely voluntary
process of a member countiy in which it signs up for "more frequent Fund
assessments" of its economic and financial pohcies and promotes a "close
policy dialogue" between the IMF and the country, with the primary goal
of "dehver[ing] clear signals on the strength of these policies".'"'' The
signals are primarily intended for "outsiders" to the countiy, as the IMF
explains (ibid):
"Signaling" refers to the information that Fund
activities can indirectly provide about countries"
performances and prospects. Such infonnation can
(see "Nigeria: Yar'Adua Signs Fiscal Responsibility Bill into Law", This Day
(Lagos), November 8, 2007, online at http://allafrica.com/stories/200711090303.html).
The Policy
Support
Instrument
(2007) International Monetaiy Fund
<http://www.imf org/external/np/exr/facts/psi.htm> at 3 October 2008.
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be used to inform the decisions of outsiders.
Outsiders can include private creditors, including
banks and bondholders, who are interested in
information on the repayment prospects of loans;
official donors and creditors, both bilateral and
multilateral, who may be interested in reassurance
about the countries they are supporting; and the
public at large.
Soon after the conclusion of its Policy Support Instrument the IMF
reported there had been unspecified improvements in institutions relating
to fiscal management.'"^ The engagement of Nigeria with the IMF in this
way suggests that its transparency initiatives are largely directed at outside
investors, creditors and donors. Even so, the Nigerian Fiscal
Responsibility Bill has been praised by Human Rights Watch,'"*" and the
Nigerian Budget Monitoring Group.'"' While the new law may represent
an important symbohc victory for those advocating fiscal govemance
reform within the country, it remains to be seen whether this will translate
into greater fiscal openness and integrity. The Bill is not yet being released
to the public despite its approval in Parliament, and this itself creates
concem about transparency and suggests that further challenges may lie
ahead with respect to implementation.
India and South Africa: Activism and NGOs driving reform
India, which does not borrow from the IMF, is an example of a
more home-grown fiscal transparency reform process. In 2003, the Indian
federal Parliament, passed the Fiscal Reform and Budget Management
Act. This Act provides a substantive medium-teiTti 3 year fiscal target and
reporting requirements for strategies and outcomes for the Central
govemment. Section 6 states that the Central government "shall take
suitable measures to ensure greater transparency in its fiscal operations in
'"^ IMF Survey, March 2008.
""^ "Chop Fine: The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Cormption and
Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria" (January 2007), at 94-98.
"Fiscal Responsibility Bill: Rising Hopes in the Horizon" (Febmaiy 26, 2007, at
http://\vww.budgetmonitoringng.org/Spotlights/2007/Q2/26/News 11618/; and "Fiscal
Responsibility: Don"t Spend Money Unless You Have It", December 13, 2007, at
http://www.budgetmonitoringng.Org/Spotlights/2007/l 2/13/News 12271 /
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the pubhc interest and minimise secrecy". In the IBP's account, the push
for greater budget openness in India started with grass roots civil society
organizations tracking misuse of funds by local governments.'"^ Yet here,
too, the IMF promoted reform of budget practices. In its 2001 fiscal
ROSC on India the IMF commented that the country had "achieved a
reasonably high level of fiscal transparency", but that "Enacting the Fiscal
Responsibility and Budget Management Bill would be a major step
forward given the emphasis it places on achieving a high standard of fiscal
transparency."'"'
South Africa: According to one recent study. South Africa ranks
above average, and indeed, above the UK, in compliance with OECD
Practices on fiscal transparency."" In particular. South Africa has a high
ranking in respect of integrity, control and accountability and a reasonable
result on budget reports and disclosures. South Africa has a substantial and
informative budget website at its National Treasuiy (www.treasuiy.gov.za
) including People's Guides to the Budget in Afrikaans, English, Tswana,
Xhosa and Zulu and setting out as the core goals of the Treasury the
following:
... Supporting efficient and sustainable pubhc
financial management is fundamental to the
promotion of economic development, good
govemance, social progress and a rising standard
of living for all South Africans. The Constitution
of the Republic (Chapter 13) mandates the
National Treasury to ensure transparency,
accountability and sound financial controls in the
management of public finances. ...
Centre on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Access to Budget Information Empowers
Citizens in India", http://wvvw.openbudKetindex.org/lndianarrative.i3df India has an
active NGO sector in this area: see, eg, People"s Budget Initiative, Charter of Budget
Demands for Union Budget 2007-08, Centi-e for Budget and Governance Accountability,
New Delhi.
Statistics Department, "India: Report on Obsei-vance of Standards and Codes-Data
Module, Response by the Authorities, and Detailed Assessments Using Data Quality
Assessment Framework" (Counti-y Report No 04/96, International Monetaiy Fund, 2004),
paras 28-29.
''° Bastida and Benito, above n 3, Figure 1.
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Over the current medium-term expenditure
framework period (2007 - 2009) the National
Treasury will focus on sustaining growth and
macroeconomic stability, while accelerating
development and the creation of employment
opportunities. ...
The high level of fiscal transparency in South Africa seems to have
been largely a response to NGO or civil society action during the late
1990s (after estabhshment of the new state in 1994). The Budget
Information Service of the Institute for Democracy in South Africa and the
IBP together produced a report on transparency and participation in South
Africa's budget process, released in October 1999 and revised in 2000.'*'
Around the same time, during the late 1990s, South Africa succeeded in
introducing a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), following
Australia's example, that remains part of the budgetary process today. We
would suggest that the reasons for relative success of implementation of
this constraint include its connection with the local activist push for fiscal
transparency."^ While South Africa was an early participant in the IMF
fiscal ROSC process, this took place later (in 2001) and was not the key
influence on South African reform. South Africa now appears to have
satisfied the IMF on the transparency score - such that its most recent
country report of 2007 does not once mention transparency as an issue or
goal.

I V . T H E CONTENT OF F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY NORMS
Transparency of budgets is generally discussed as a neutral
procedural norm that will produce better or more predictable fiscal policy.
We argue that transparency standards have more normative content than
this suggests, and may serve different constituencies and substantive

Folscher, Ki'afchik and Shapiro, above n 2, 3. The South African report is said to have
influenced research in other countries in Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America; ibid
4.
Matthew Andrews, "Creating Space for Effective Political Engagement in
Development" in Sina Odugbemi and Thomas L Jacobson (eds). Governance Reform
Under Real-World Conditions: Citizens, Stakeholders, and Voice (2008) 95; and sources
cited therein.
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policy ends depending on the types of disclosure and processes they
require. Analysis of the IMF Code reveals a much larger "wishlist" of
desirable practices for govemance, subsumed under the overall banner of
fiscal transparency. While we will not set out exhaustively all of the
elements of fiscal transparency as proposed by the various intemational
codes and national laws and policies, it is useful to survey and discuss key
elements of the IMF Code as the dominant model, as well as selected
features of the OECD Practices.
A. THE ROLE OF L A W AND STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT
The first section of the IMF Code (and accompanying Manual)
emphasises the "clarity of roles and responsibilities of govemmenf, in
particular the estabhshment of clear and public mles about the stmcture
and fiscal powers and responsibilities of legislative, executive and judicial
branches of govemment; setting out the relationship between govemment
and public corporations; governing the relationship between government
and private enterprise and public availability of contractual amangements.
In addition, the Code requires comprehensive, public and understandable
budget, tax and other public finance laws, regulations and administrative
procedures relating to collection, commitment and use of public funds; the
ability to appeal tax and non-tax obligations and an explicitly legal basis
for management of govemment assets and liabilities.
The IMF appears, in this section, to be requiring establishment in
member countries of a solid constitutional legal framework for
govemment, together with property and contract rights, in a way that is
recognisably "Western" in form. The Code steers clear of requiring
"democracy" but it assumes a legislature and the separation of powers
including a clear legal basis for the power to tax; a legal basis for resource
distribution and public-private contracting; a working judiciary and
appeals system; and clear legal defmition of public propeify and public
debt. The requirement for clear rales about taxation implicitly assumes
private property (as there is then something to tax). Thus, the "legal
institutions" of propeity and contract are embedded in this first part of the
Code and the necessity for a clear demarcation of public and private
realms inscribes the market into the very stracture of the state.

2008]

DEFINING FISCAL TRANSPARENCY

39

This first section also makes clear that the IMF places considerable
emphasis on the role of national laws in securing fiscal transparency. The
Code states generally that "[t]he collection, commitment, and use of pubhc
funds should be governed by comprehensive budget, tax, and other public
finance laws, regulations and administrative procedures.""^ The
implementation Manual more clearly endorses the concept of specific
fiscal transparency legislation. Thus, the Code evidences considerable
faith in law as delivering the "govemance" limb of development and in its
use for the formalisation of essentially pohtical and economic processes.
In its Practices the OECD notes that some countries have
legislated fiscal mles while others have merely adopted policies or
guidelines."'' It appears less persuaded than the IMF about the value of
law reform per se in the absence of political will, observing that
"enforcing fiscal frameworks is a political economy issue as well as a
technical one.""^ Nonetheless, it identifies how (as seen in Part 3), fiscal
transparency laws have been implemented by many developed and
developing countries as a mechanism for improving fiscal discipline and
pohcy outcomes. These arrangements generally support fiscal
transparency by providing a clear statement as to policy objectives and the
manner in which these will be achieved, including informing the public of
fiscal risks. One fimction of these laws is that they can help to build
support for fiscal consolidation, by strengthening the credibility of fiscal
pohcies and by increasing accountability."''
B . BUDGET PROCESS AND FISCAL OBJECTIVES
The second key element of the IMF Code is a requirement for
"open budget processes following an established timetable and guided by
well-defined macroeconomic and fiscal policy objectives" (Item 2). In
particular, the Code requires:
•

Adequate time for a draft budget to be considered by the
legislature;

m¥ Code, above n I , s 1.2,1.
OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, above n 1, Table 3, at 122-123.
Joumard et al, above n 19, 130.
" " I M F Manual (2007), above n 1, 52.
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A "realistic" budget presented in a medium termframeworkand an
assessment of "fiscal sustainability" setting out the main
assumptions and sensitivity analysis (for estimated errors);
Clear statement of any fiscal targets or rules;
Description of major expenditure and revenue measures lined to
policy objectives and with estimates of impact on the budget and
the economy;
Clear mechanisms for coordination of budget and off-budget
activities; and
An effective accounting system for monitoring and tracking
revenues, commitments, liabilities, assets including a timely
midyear report and auditing of accounts to be presented to the
legislature and published within a year of the budget.

These requirements for open and timely budget information are
clearly essential for a legislature, and citizens, to participate adequately in
the budget process. Similarly, effective accounting of revenues and the
setting out and costing of expenditure goals are crucial. Both of these
elements support democratic participation in budgeting as well as donor or
lender review of a govemment's fiscal position.
The concept of a "reahstic" budget appears to relate primarily to
the economic assumptions in the budget and assumptions about revenue
projections and "targets" set out in multi-year development plans.'"
Revenue forecasting, discussed at p. 4 9 of the Manual, is notoriously
difficult even for developed countries, except for the mle of thumb that a
good starting point for predicting this year's revenues is the revenues
achieved the year before. Treasuries of developed coimtries including the
UK have been criticised for under-estimating tax revenues, in particular
corporate tax;"^ developing countries may be too optimistic about revenue
estimates, in particular where they are striving to increase "tax effort".
Both tendencies may be political, as well as statistical, at base.
The IMF and OECD also both emphasise the creation of formal
procedures taking a substantial period of time including the advance
provision of draft budgets and policies (several months before the year
" ' I b i d 47-48.
"^ See, eg, Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10.
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commences); planning over a medium term framework beyond the fiscal
year and managing "sustainably" over the long term - this would usually
be a time well beyond a normal democratic electoral cycle. In particular,
the MTEF (or the similar notion of a medium-term budget framework) has
been most often proposed as an extemal "blueprint" for reform and is
argued by the IMF to be essential.
However, even the IMF identifies how difficult establishing a
plausible and sustained MTEF can be. The Manual points to success in the
UK, Australia, Chile and Brazil. Nonetheless, the IMF underlines the
necessity for "stringent conditions", "robust revenue forecasts" and
"rigorous" connections between target expenditures and the expected
economic prospects over time, "clearly defined and fully costed policy
proposals" and emphasises that a medium-term framework is "most likely
to be effective in the context of a real, stable, transparent, and wellpublicised commitment to fiscal control"."' These conditions are very
challenging for developing countries with poor systems, staffing and
govemmental commitment.
It is also interesting to note the mechanisms for coordination of "on
budgef and "off budget" items. Clearly, if we see the budget as a central
element of democratic govemance, expenditures should be largely "onbudget". However, it is often the case that various items are "off-budget",
such as pension entitlements and special puipose funds. Further, as
discussed above, most aid for developing countries is currently dehvered
off-budget. The very recent shift to putting at least some aid on budget is
outlined above. It is laudable that the IMF calls for "a strong interface
between the government's plamiing or development framework such as
the PRSP and its medium-term budget.'^" I f aid flows are also accounted
for in this overall framework, this can improve management and
coordination of aid and other revenues and spending. However, on the
whole the IMF Code camiot address the issue of accountability of aid
flows as it is currently drafted; these are outside the scope of its fiscal
transparency framework.

" IMF Manual (2007), above n I , 50.
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C. PUBLIC BUDGET DOCUMENTATION
The third key element of the IMF Code is a requirement for timely
publication of all budget documentation and especially of fiscal
information. Again, this is to be a "legal obligation" of government. In
particular, the IMF would hke to see:
•

Adherence to release of information in advance and pubhcation of
outcomes of at least 2 preceding years and forecasts for at least
following 2 years;
• Tax expenditure statements and explanation of quasi-fiscal activity
and other fiscal risks;
• Reporting of fiscal data on a gross basis including separate
identification of receipts from all revenue sources including taxes,
resource-related activities, foreign aid, information about
expenditures and information about debt, other significant
liabilities (such as pensions) and natural resource assets;
• Reporting of subnational govemment budgets and public
corporation positions;
• A periodic report on long-term public finances;
• Wide distribution of a "clear and simple summary guide" at the
time of the annual budget;
• Reporting of overall balance (fiscal deficit or surplus) and gross
debt of government for the period; and
e Reporting of results linked to objectives of major budget programs
on an annual basis.
In general, few would disagree that making these types of
infonnation public benefits a wide range of social interests. However some
controversy surrounds the requirement of a report on long-term finances,
because of the virtual impossibility of making accurate cost or revenue
predictions over a long horizon, creating a risk that such reports will do
more to mislead than to inform. Neil Buchanan for instance has argued
that long-term forecasting, also known as "generational" accounting, tends
to raise false fears that social programs are unaffordable over the long
tenn or will be excessively burdensome to future generations.'^' To this
Neil Buchanan.
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we would add that requiring such a report goes beyond simple disclosure
to direct what kinds of information fiscal policy makers should gather,
analyse and consider, and once again underlines the paramount importance
of fiscal prudence and discipline. These values are fiirther reinforced by
the need to disclose aggregate budget balance and debt. In contrast, it is
striking that neither the IMF Code nor the O E C D Practices call for
disclosure of any specific information about the distributive impact of the
annual budget or fiscal policy for the current population. The content of
tax expenditure reports and other public documents is either left to
govemments to determine, or is weighted toward types of information that
will expose any risk of fiscal imbalance.
D . INTEGRITY OF DATA AND BUREAUCRACY
The fourth element of the IMF Code incorporates a number of
different strands relating to assurance of integrity of data and bureaucracy.
The IMF caUs for integrity measures to assure the quality of fiscal data
including forecasts; indication of cash/accraal accounting basis and
application of "generally accepted accounting standards" for the public
sector in a manner that is internally consistent and reconciled with other
data sources. Intemal audit of government activities and finances is also
proposed, as is extemal audit of public finances and policies by an
independent national audit body and by independent experts, and
collection of national statistics by an independent institution. These data
and accounting criteria draw heavily on the establishment and
dissemination of global accounting standards for both public and private
bodies - integrating the "fiscal transparency" norm development process
into a wider network of global standards and norms, discussed further in
part 7 below.
Under this heading, the IMF also calls for clear ethical standards
for public servants and publication of their conditions, and in procurement,
purchase and sale of pubhc assets and major transactions; for
independence of the revenue authority from political direction; for
protection of taxpayer rights; and for a requirement on the revenue
authority to report regularly to the public. Here, the IMF Code overlaps
with the very considerable work that has been done in the last decade by
the international institutions responding to coniiption.
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The reference to an independent revenue authority has a long
history in IMF and other reform recommendations for developing
countries over the last few years. The OECD has recently noted that the
estabhshment of autonomous revenue authorities has been a "high-profile
innovation, and a particular focus for donor support", and about 30 such
authorities have now been established in developmg countries, mostly in
Africa and South A m e r i c a . H o w e v e r , as the OECD also notes,
experience in successftilly establishing an "autonomous" agency
independent of political interference has been mixed and "early gains have
been hard to sustain" (ibid) (South Africa, as in so many other ways, is an
exception). As "tax collection cannot be entirely divorced from making tax
and budget policy", reporting lines to the executive government must be
carefiiUy established.
Even more recently, a new emphasis on taxpayer rights as opposed
merely to strengthening the revenue authority is welcome, as this can help
establish a more sound political basis for participation in taxing and
spending.'^'' This seems to be one way in which the IMF has (indirectly)
acknowledged the need for active engagement and protection of taxpayers,
albeit they propose this in a rather limited context of engagement with the
revenue authority rather than the budget process more broadly.
In this Part we have reviewed the main features of the IMF model
and have pointed out that it does far more to promote values of fiscal
prudence, discipline, and integrity than to support other possible goals of
transparency, such as equity or democratic oversight. No one could
seriously protest that prudence, discipline and integrity are unimportant they clearly are imperative to all citizens including those concerned to
improve the fairness and democratic oversight of budgets. This is
reflected in the fact that independent watchdogs such as IBP in the US and
IDASA in South Africa have incorporated many of the IMF's budget
transparency requirements. However as discussed in the next Part these
groups have supplemented the IMF standards with criteria of their own

OECD, Governance, Taxation and Accountability: Issues and Practices (2008),
accessed at www.oecd.ora at 5 October 2008, p. 28
'^•^ Floreiis Luoga, "Taxpayers" Rights in the Context of Democratic Governance:
Tanzania" (2002) 33(3) Institute of Development Studies Bulletin 50; and see recent work
by the Tax Justice Network on taxpayer rights, vvww.taxiu5tice.net.
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related to social equality and democracy.

V. F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY AND DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE
Distributive politics are at the heart of fiscal policy and will often
make or break the viability of a reform. For this pragmatic reason i f no
other, the omission of distributive analysis from the dominant model of
fiscal transparency is problematic; but we also consider analysis of
distributional impact to be essential for the establishment of fairness in
principle.
As already noted there is no requirement in the IMF Code or
OECD Practices for govemments to report on how fiscal policy decisions
impact different income groups or segments of the population. However
in the most recent version of the implementation Manual that accompanies
the Code, the IMF does briefly acknowledge that fiscal discipline may
involve political tradeoffs that should ideally be disclosed:
Refoims aimed at reducing fiscal deficits and
improving macro stability, or at enhancing
efficiency, may affect different income and social
groups differently, and may hurt or benefit
vulnerable and low-income groups more than
others. It is important for transparency that some
assessment of these impacts be included in the
budget documentation...Poverty and Social Impact
Analysis (PSIA) refers to the analysis of the
distributional impact of policies and pohcy
reforms on the welfare of different groups, with a
specific
emphasis
on
the
poor
and
vulnerable...Good practice would require that
budget documentation include at least a simple
analysis of the differential impacts of new policies
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and measures.
The addition of this commentary may reflect the IMF's sensitivity
to criticisms of its stmctural adjustment programs, and the need to
acknowledge the social tum in development discourse more often in its
own policy advice. However it is important to note that the Manual is 124
pages long (plus glossary and references), and these passages only briefly
interrupt an otherwise unrelenting focus on fiscal discipline and integrity.
Nor do they impose more than a baseline obligation to include some form
of basic analysis. Most importantly, these recommendations are not
reflected in the Code itself The reason may have to do with concems that
this type of information will increase the likelihood of political resistance
to tough decisions about spending restraint or taxation, challenging the
ability of govemments to deliver on their promises of fiscal pmdence. As
Heald discusses, there is one view that ""too much" transparency produces
"over-exposure", leading to losses of effectiveness through high levels of
transaction costs and excessive politicization."'^^
Not surprisingly, NGOs involved with budget transparency have
placed social equity issues higher on the agenda. In developing the IBP
Index, the IBP states that IMF standards "do not go far enough to ensure
that budgeting is responsive and accountable to citizens."'^^ To redress
this, the IBP's survey questionnaire includes the following questions, to be
answered on a transparency scale of 1-5:
55. Does the executive"s budget or any supporting
budget documentation present information on
policies
(both
proposals
and
existing
commitments) in at least the budget year that are
intended to benefit directly the country"s most
impoverished populations?...
57.

Does the executive make available to the

IMF Manual (2007), above n I , 54-55. The Manual goes on briefly to describe
various methods that can be used to cany out PSIA (Box 10).
'"^ David Heald, "Fiscal Transparency: Concepts, Measurement and U.K. Practice",
(2003) 81:4 Public AclminisU-ation 723-759, at 727, citing V. Tanzi, "Corruption around
the world", 45 IMF Staff Papers (1998) 559-94.
IBP Index, above n *, p. 3.
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public an analysis of the distribution of the tax
burden?...
66. Are citizens able in practice to obtain nonfmancial information related to expenditures (for
example, number of beneficiaries, number of
persons employed by the program, etc.) for
individual programs in a format that is more highly
disaggregated than that which appears in the
executive"s budget proposal if they request it from
a ministry or agency?...
110.
Does the year-end report, or another
document
released
to
public
by
the
executive...explain the difference between the
enacted level of fiinds intended to benefit directly
the country"s most impoverished populations and
the actual outcome?...'^'
In addition the IBP asks numerous questions about availability of
information to citizens and recommends that the right to obtain not only
budget documents but also detailed information about particular program
expenditures at the local level should be estabhshed by legislation.'^^
An earlier 2001 study of budget transparency in Latin American
countries also highlighted the connection of transparency to social equity,
stating that "knowledge and analysis of the budget should be sufficient to
make it possible for the external observers to verity whether the
distribution of...resources and their application reflect social preferences
and comply with the criteria of equality and justice".'^' Notably, however,
that survey instrament did not include direct questions about the
The .survey questionnaire with countiy responses is available online at
http://www.openbudgetindex.0rg/#Count1ySu1nmariesandQuestionnaires.
™ See for example the Open Budget Initiative summary report, at 19-20.
™ Index of Budget Transparency in Five Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil,
Chile,
Mexico
and Peru
(no publisher or date, available online at
httD://internationalbudget.orK/resources/LAbudtraus.pdf). above n *, p. 11. This sUidy
was facilitated in part by the IBP but conducted independently by the Latin American
partners.
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availability of distributive information related to budget policies. These
issues were addressed indirectly instead, through numerous questions
about citizen access to and influence over the budget process. This
approach has remained consistent in two follow-up studies, the most
recent of which adopts a more politically neutral definition of transparency
but also states that "applied budget analysis.. .makes it possible to evaluate
who wins and who loses with the distribution of public resources.'^"
In South Africa, the collaborative 1999 study by the IBP and
IDASA included among its many findings that "analysis of tax incidence
is lacking"'^' in South Africa"s budget documentation. The report also
recommended that detailed information on spending allocations be
provided to Parliament earlier in the budget process.'''^ It described the
limited but growing role of civil society groups in meeting with
Parliamentary committees for example to discuss priorities of low income
people and women, as well as a range of sectoral social welfare issues, and
cited the lack of consistent and detailed data as a barrier to civil society
oversight of budgets.'^^
Like the IMF and OECD, these NGOs have attempted to articulate
universal standards of fiscal transparency that can be applied to evaluate
country practice and create pressure for refonn. The NGOs have taken
some modest steps to add a distributive lens to the assessment of fiscal
transparency, while also confirming the importance of reliable information
regarding the government's fiscal prudence and integrity.
Budget transparency legislation at the countiy level has tended to
track the IMF/OECD model, meaning that it makes no explicit reference
to social justice indicators. The Australian Charier does not make an
assessment of distributional impact or fairness of current generations but
only of future ones. One exception is the UK Code for Fiscal Stability
Latin American Index of Budget Trcmsparency 2005: A comparison of 8 countries
(Managua, Nicaragua: October 2005), at 7; and Latin American Index of Budget
Transparency 2003: A comparison of 10 countries (November 2003), at 5 (online at
http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/BudTrans/English.pdn.
Ibid., at 21.
Ibid., at 46.
'^^ Ibid., at 49-51. Note that this project led to a further study of budget transparency in
several African countries: cite.
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which includes "fairness" as one of the principles that must govern fiscal
policy, and defines this as follows:
The principle of fairness means that, so far as
reasonably practical, the Government shall seek to
operate fiscal policy in a way that takes into
account the financial effects on future generations,
as well as its distributional impact on the current
population.'^'^
The first part of this definition, the mandate to consider fiiture generations,
relates back to the issue of sustainability and the need for discipline over
current social spending. However the reference to fairness within the
current generation creates at least an opening for scrutiny of the
distributive impact of budgets. This potential is not realized in practice,
because none of the public reports that the govemment must issue under
the Code are required to include a distributional analysis. Emmerson et al
(2004) report that the UK Treasury has on some occasions provided
information about the impact of its proposals on different income
groups.'''^ They recommend making this mandatory:
There is no reason why the Code...should not
contain an explicit requirement that, where
significant and possible, the distributional impact
on the current population of new measures should
be made pubhcly available. Similarly estimates of
the impact on marginal deduction rates across the
whole population should also be provided...It is
also desirable that indicative information be
provided as early as possible in the consultation
Finance Act 1998, s.l55(2); and Code for Fiscal Stability, paragraph 7. The other
principles governing fiscal policy are transparency, stability, responsibility and
efficiency. For another example see the province of Ontario, Canada"s Fiscal
Transparency andAccoimtabili!)' Act, 2004, S.O. 2004, c.27, s.2, which includes "equity"
among the principles governing fiscal policy in the province. For discussion of this
legislation see Maiy Condon and Lisa Philipps, "Transnational Market Governance and
Economic Citizenship: New Frontiers for Feminist Legal Theory", (2005) 28 TJwmas
Jefferson Law Review 105-150, at 139-149.
'"'^ Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10, 29.
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process rather than simply being provided when all
of the details of the policy have been finalised.
The obvious problem with giving governments discretion to
publish such information selectively is that they will tend to do so only
when it is politically convenient. Even i f distributive analyses were to be
required for all new policies, there is a fiirther concern about how to
ensure a degree of rigour and objectivity in the way such data are
presented. This points to the need for effective oversight of the executive
by legislative and civil society actors, which we discuss in the next Part.
In Pakistan, the transparency provisions of the Fiscal
Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act 2005 are based on the IMF model
and do not require disclosure of any distributional data. However equity
issues are addressed in a different way, by making the statute's deficit and
debt reduction targets subject to an exception for "social and poverty
alleviation related expenditures," which are not to fall below 4.5% of GDP
in any given year.'^' The teim "social and poverty related expenditure" is
defined to include, inter alia, health, education and "such other
expenditures as may be specified in the National Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper from time to time."'''^ The government must report on its
compliance with these objectives in an annual fiscal policy statement,
meaning that some account must be given as to the amount of budgetary
spending which qualifies as "social and poverty related".'''' The IBP
reported in 2 0 0 6 that Pakistan's budget did include some information
"highlighting the impact of key policies intended to alleviate poveity",
though some details were excluded.'''" By contrast, the government did not
provide any analysis of the distribution of the tax burden.''" The UK

'^"Ibid.
S.3. This provision also states that education and health related expenditures should
double as a percentage of GDP over 10 years. See also s.9 which protects social and
poverty alleviation spending from any cuts that must be made to meet deficit and debt
targets.

S.20).
'^'ss4,6.
IBP, Open Budget Questionnaire, Pakistan (Q.55). The country received a "B" rating
on this point.
Q57.
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received an "A" grade in both these areas.
Tax expenditures are one aspect of fiscal policy that cries out for
more open distributive analysis. The IMF Code recommends that tax
expenditures be reported in the budget documents but does not prescribe
exactly what information should be reported about them.''*^ It is common,
particularly for developed countries, to provide a report of some kind
conceming tax expenditures compared to a defined baseline "normal"
income or consumption tax; this is required in the Australian Charter}'^'^
However, the reports are frequently not well integrated into the budget
process, contain inadequate estimates of revenue foregone, and contain
little or no evidence about the distributive impact of particular tax
concessions.'''^ This weakens their usefiilness in improving transparency.
Tax expenditure reporting could be strengthened significantly in
developed and developing countries to illuminate the benefits received by
different social groups and firms. India began releasing tax expenditure
reports with its 2006-07 budget, and in 2008-09 included a distributive
analysis of coiporate tax expenditures showing that the smallest firms
were receiving the least benefit from these concessions.'''^ This type of
initiative could help build support for base-broadening refoims in
developing countries, which has been identified as cmcial in order to
increase the resources available for anti-poverty and other development

IBP, Open Budget Questionnaire, United Kingdom (Q.55 and 57).
1MB Code, *. Since its establishment by Stanley Surrey in the United States during the
1960s, the concept of tax expenditures, which compares the income tax law with a
"benclmiark" income tax said to be an ideal income tax system, has had a primary
political purpose, to draw legislators" attention to the many concessions, exemptions and
other incentives in the US tax code and to the implicit "cost to revenue", or revenue
foregone, as a result of these concessions. For all of the flaws that can be identified with
respect to the tax expenditure concept, this is still its most valuable function and it is thus
best understood as a strategic intervention into the budget process.
Cl 12
Swift et al, 2004; Boadway 2007; Mark Burton; Julie Smith (2004)
See Ministry of Finance, India, Union Budget 2006-07, Receipts Budget, Annex 12,
"Tax Expenditiu-e under the Central Tax System: Financial Year 2004-05" (onhne at
httn://indiabudget.nic.in,/iib2006-07/rec/annex 12.pdf); and Ministiy of Finance, India,
Union Budget 2008-09, Receipts Budget, Annex 12, "Revenue foregone under tlie
Central Tax System: Financial Years 2006-07 and 2007-08 (online at
http://indiabudget.nic.in/ub2008-09/rec/annexl2.i3dr)
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spending. Moreover, we suggest that this strategy could have some
advantages over others that focus on reducing tax competition through
more international coordination of tax policy.
Many intemational tax scholars have criticized the ill-considered
use of investment tax incentives by developing countries, pointing out
negative effects on cojqjorate tax revenue and on the efficiency and
fairness of tax systems.' ' The persistence of this form of tax competition
has led some to recommend changes in the way developed countries tax
business income earned abroad by their resident multi-nationals, to
eliminate any benefits from host country tax incentives, thereby freeing
those countries from pressure to engage in self-destractive tax
competition.'''^ Others have argued just the opposite, that developed
countries should engage in more tax sparing to preserve the value of these
incentives, on the basis this may help developing countries to attract much
needed investment, as well as according them greater autonomy over
domestic tax policy.''*' Promoting more transparency at the country level
with respect to the cost and distributive impact of tax expenditures could
help to resolve this impasse by enabling the countiy's own citizens to
challenge incentives that shift the burden of taxation onto local firms and
individuals without achieving any clear benefits. Similarly in developed
countries, tax expenditures have grown rapidly as a favoured mechanism
for delivering social programs. A perpetual criticism of this trend is the
way it tends to hide the distribution of costs and benefits. Requiring that
an analysis of these effects be made public with the budget would
radically increase the transparency of fiscal pohcy overall.
The gender budgeting initiatives that have been undertaken in
several countries, including India and South Africa, provide yet another
angle on distributive transparency.'^" The Platform of Action adopted at
the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing (1995)
called on governments to "facilitate, at appropriate levels, more open and
transparent budget processes"'^' and mandated "the integration of a gender
eg Vann; ICeene and Simone; I<.im Brooks
eg Avi-Yonah 2008
''^ eg Margoliatti; Karen Brown
See, eg, Wliat does budget 2007-2008 offer women?. Economic and Political Weekly.
42(16); 21-27 April 2007. p.1423-1428
Cl. 165(i)
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perspective in budgetary decisions on policies and programmes". The
UN and other intemational agencies then organized to support many local
gender budgeting projects at both the civil society and govemmental
level.
The basic starting point of these projects is that fiscal policy often
purports to be gender neutral on its face, but its impact is seldom gender
neutral because of the different economic status and roles of men and
women. A variety of methods are used to reveal and analyse the
differential impacts of taxes and spending on women and men, in teims of
both the distribution of costs and benefits, and behavioural effects (for
example marginal choices between paid and unpaid labour, or the
effectiveness of business incentives). In addition, many initiatives focus on
increasing women's participation in budget processes as well as the
capacity of civil society organizations to critically analyse budget
documents from a gender perspective. Advocates of gender budgeting
often use the language of transparency in describing its value. In
particular, we note that the UN Financing for Development conference has
recently emphasized the importance of including a gender lens in the
analysis of fiscal policy.'^'* This sits in stark contrast with the standards of
transparency articulated by the IMF and OECD, which do not mention
gender impact as a relevant fact to be reported on by govemments. Nor
does gender receive any explicit mention in the NGO-led budget
transparency exercises, with the exception of the IBP/IDASA report.

V I . F I S C A L TRANSPARENCY AND DEMOCRATIC
EMPOWERMENT
The interventions of the IMF and OECD on budget transparency,
discussed above, raise concerns about a democratic deficit with respect to
fiscal policy, as these actors are most concemed to promote fiscal
Cl. 345
For discussion see Lisa Philipps, "Gender Budgets and Tax Policy-making:
Contrasting Canadian and Australian Experiences" (2006) 24(2) Law in Context 143; Tlie
Official Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women containing the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action UN Doc A/CONF.I77/20 (1995); Janet Stotsky
(IMF).
Draft Outcomes of the Doha Financing For Development conference.
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discipline and capital market efficiency, and less aware of or concemed
with distributive and other impacts on local populations.'^^ This
democratic deficit relates both to the expected audience for fiscal
transparency and the overall understanding of the purpose and processes
of budgeting. I f the budget is, as the O E C D suggests, the most important
pohcy document of a govemment, the question of who receives
information and is empowered to participate is cmcial for the legitimacy,
fairness and sustainability of budget decisions.
The IMF Code itself does not state who the expected audience is of
fiscal information but the Manual states that transparency involves
openness to "the public" about "the stmcture and functions of govemment,
fiscal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and fiscal projections".'^^
The "public", as understood by the Manual, incorporates four distinct
audiences. First, govemments themselves (past, current and future) to
assist in improving economic decision-making. Second, "citizens ...
giving them the information they need to hold their govemment
accountable for its policy choices". Third, "intemational capital markets".
Last but one assumes, not least, the IMF itself, in its role in economic
"surveillance"
of member
countries
"to
assess economic
vulnerabilities".'"
The explicit recognition of citizens in the IMF Manual is a
significant change from the first edition released in 1998, which
emphasised "sui-veillance of economic pohcies by countiy authorities,
financial markets, and intemational institutions".'^^ Indeed, a Note to the
previous edition commented that "there is an issue" as to the language(s)
in which information should be made available and even suggests that it is
"unclear" whether countries should routinely publish fiscal infonnation
"in a commonly-used" national language; it was considered at that time
much more impoitant that "outsiders following a country" should be able
to understand the Budget, in particular for "countries seeking access to

Alkoby paper and literature discussed in it. Note that we are dealing with an area of
policy making that is already prone to democratic deficits at the national level: Philipps,
*; Stewart, *.
IMF Mamial (2007), above n 1, para 15, p. 13
Ibid, paras 2 and 3 p. 8
IMF Manual, 1998, para*.
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intemational capital markets".'^' The OECD Practices address the role of
citizens also, in particular by requiring publication of reports and active
promotion of an understanding of the budget process by citizens and
NGOs.'^° How^ever, the most important way in which both the IMF Code
and OECD Practices see accountability to citizens being achieved is, not
surprisingly, through the institutional mechanisms of legislative review of
an executive budget.'^'
While they consider accountability to the legislature important, the
IBP and other NGOs involved in budget assessment have a different vision
of democratic control over fiscal processes. The IBP Open Budget
Initiative is explicitly oriented to empowering relatively disadvantaged
constituencies to engage with budgetary policy, though it is also concemed
to expose fiscal cormption or unrealistic and impmdent budgeting. NGO
researchers in Latin America put the issue as follows:
"Participation by the citizenry throughout the
budget process is indispensable, not only to
strengthen the democracy of a country, but also
because it represents an effective way to ensure
that the population's most pressing needs are
covered within the government's budget.""'^
They also find that citizen participation receives the lowest score of any of
the variables in their Index.
In spite of the acknowledgement in fiscal transparency laws and
codes of the role of the legislature, it is relatively rare for discussion about
transparency and the legislature to explicitly identify the political nature involving compromise and negotiation - of budgets themselves.
Furthennore, while it is generally considered that one role of the
legislature - and of fiscal rales imposed by it - is to constrain the
executive from undisciplined spending and taxing, much discussion about

Previous IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency, para 57 and note 49, available from
http://\v\vvv.imf ort;/external/np/Fad/trans/manual/sec02a.htm .
'""Page 4
OECD Practices, cl. I . l , 3.4; IMF Code, items 2.1.1, 4.3.2.
Latin American Index of Budget Transparency 2005, p. 16.
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budget decision-making, in particular conceming fiscal discipline, seeks to
constrain the legislature by institutionalising, i f possible, a strong leader in
the government.'^'' The common factor is not accountability (of one
branch of govemment to another) but fiscal discipline to establish
credibility for the market.'^'*
I f we refocus the discussion towards the fundamental purpose of a
budget, being to establish politically legitimate and sustainable
distributional decisions for a country, we can also rethinlc the meaning and
uses of fiscal transparency. Fiscal transparency norms have the potential to
expand the pohtical space for budget decision-making, by expanding the
ability of citizens to participate in govemment decision-making beyond
the power to vote for representatives in a legislature over an electoral
cycle. Effective fiscal transparency norms could operate to connect fiscal
policy-makers with existing networks of governmental departments,
business, civil society and local communities so as to more effectively
design, assess and implement fiscal decisions. Transparency norms and
frameworks should seek to increase the knowledge of ordinary citizens,
NGOs and "civil society" generally about fiscal policy decisions and their
impact on the distribution of benefits and burdens tliroughout society.
The use of fiscal transparency nonns to increase participation
would fit with a global trend to encourage increased public participation in
policy-making generally. As a broad principle, the UN has stated that
"widespread participation in decision-making processes" is important in
enabling "the creation of the critical mass of support needed to change
institutions".'^^ Indeed, in what has been called a "paradigm" shift for
development policy in many developing countries, the second half of the

See, eg, Alesina and Perotti, above n *; IMF Manual emphasising executive control, p
A recent insightful article about fiscal reform in Chile, presented as part of a joint
OECD/Organisation of American States fomm on public sector transparency, emphasises
the combined macroeconomic, managerial and political role of budgets and the need, in
the longer term, to establish a political consensus through increasing and strengthening
the contributions of the Congress, in addition to a strong government leader and imposing
a strict fiscal rule: Mario Marcel and Marcelo Tokman, "Building a consensus for fiscal
reform in Chile" in OECD, Public Sector Transparency, above n. *, 107-123, at p. 108.
'"^ United Nations, World Economic and Social Siin'ey 2000, Department of International
Economics and Social Affairs U N Doc ST/ESA/273, p. *.
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1990s saw a massive enhancement of consultation in relation to
expenditure policies to generate and implement PRSPs associated with
conditional loans from the IMF and the World Bank and aid funding from
donors.'^*' A concept of "participatory developmenf has become the
norm, at least as a matter of rhetoric, in the broader development discourse
whether carried out by multilateral development agencies or nongovemment organisations.'^'
Critics have suggested that the participatory debate has not been
expanded, in particular in respect of macroeconomic policy (including
fiscal pohcy) and that policy discussions and decision-making processes
are not well-embedded in existing political stmctures such as the
parliament.Nonetheless, a recent evaluation of PRSPs and their
interaction with budget formation, examining case studies of Tanzania
Burkina Faso, Bolivia, Vietnam and Cambodia, concluded that PRSPs
have enhanced public education about govemment policies and
expenditures and, to some extent, participation in budget processes.'^'
Though it speaks directly to fiscal policy choices, the PRSP
process has been criticised as being insufficiently linked to the budget."*'
The stiidy of Alonso et al observes that the Ministry of Finance is not
always given a lead role in the PRSP process, which may often be
established in a separate ministry.'" This separation of the PRSP policy
framework from the budget is likely to lead to a failure of "ownership" by
the Ministry of Finance of the PRSP process as well as a failure to hnk the
Fantu Chei-u, "Building and supporting PRSPs in Africa: what has worked well so far?
What needs changing?" (2006) 27(2) Third World Quarterly 355-376, p. *.
Maia Green, "Participatoiy development and the appropriation of agency in Southern
Tanzania" (2000) 20(1) Critique of Antlvopology 67-89; see, eg. D Narayan and L
Srinivasan, Participatoiy Development Took Kit: Materials to Facilitate Coininunit)'
Empowerment (1994, World Bank: Washington DC).
""^ Eg, Andrew Sumner "In search of the post-Washington (Dis)consensus: the "missing"
content of PRSPs" (2006) 27(8) Third World Quarterly 140I-14I2; Morrison and Singer,
above n *.
Rosa Alonso, Lindsay Judge and Jeni Klugman, "PRSPs and Budgets: A Synthesis of
Five Case Studies" in Stefan ICoeberle, Zoran Stavreski and Jan Walliser (eds). Budget
support as more effective aid? Recent experiences and emerging lessons (2006, World
Bank: Washington DC). 155-192, p. 159.
Stevens, above n 9, 8-9.
Ibid., p. 166.
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PRSP properly to taxing and budgetary spending. That "weak link
between the PRSP and the budgets" is identified as a crucial problem in
many countries; the solution seems to be a MTEF but establishing one
successfully is, as outlined above, very challenging."^ Problems also arise
with a failure to ensure that local govemments participate in both PRSP
formulation and budget decisions at a national level, although PRSPs are
supposed to be driven by local community consultation and tax systems
are increasingly decentralised. A further issue is that it is rare for
consultation in a PRSP process to involve discussion of the taxation side
of the budget. Attention needs to be paid to what "mechanisms of
accountability" could incorporate the poor into the tax reform debate and
"enhance their ability to articulate their interests and advance a
progressive system of public finance, both in taxation and
expenditures"."^ The disconnect between participation in the PRSP
process and the budget process is an indication of the inadequacy of
content of fiscal transparency norms which have tended to focus heavily
on demonstrating pmdence and disciphne, rather than the equity or
legitimacy of budgetary policy.
Consultative exercises have also become popular in many
countries as a means of securing pohtical support for tax reform."'* The
IMF Code calls for adequate consultation in reform,"^ but surprisingly the
OECD does not. In particular in developed countries, consuhation about
the teclmical or detailed policy elements or content of tax reform is
frequently carried out with the private sector, in particular business groups
and tax professional advisers, on aspects of pohcy or on the way a tax law
or policy is implemented or administered, and less often with a broad
spectmm of taxpayers."'' I f such consuhation is too targeted to particular
Fantu Chem, above n *, p. 362
Sabates and Schneider, Seminar Report, DfiD and World Bank Taxation Seminar, at
the Centre for the Frrture State (Overseas Development Institute, University of Surrey,
October 31-November 1, 2002, Taxation, Accotmtabilit)' and the Poor, p.5; and see
Alonso et al, above n. *, p. 162.
See Cedric Sandford, Successfiil Tax Reform: Lessons from an Analysis of Tax Refonn
in Six Countries (Bath: Fiscal Publications, 1993); Thomas E. McDonnell, "Toward
Getting it Right: Reflections on 50 years of the Tax Legislative Process in Canada"
(1995) 95:5 Cdn.Tax J. 1131...
Article 1.2.3.
Richard K Gordon and Victor Thuronyi observe that little attention has been paid to
the process of designing and drafting tax legislation in developing countries, with a few
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business sectors or taxpayers, it may blur into the "thin" politics of
taxation as described by Moore and Rakner, which may essentially
comprises special interest negotiating behind closed doors; even where
more public and institutionalised, as in the "tax policy network" identified
by Stewart in respect of taxation of the corporate sector in Australia, this
network is not open to broader citizen engagement."' Ideally, a fiscal
transparency law would build institutional procedures and mechanisms
that would help to ensure that consultation in policy formation is pubhc to
the extent possible and that enable a wide range of taxpayers an
opportunity to engage in the process.
A range of problems can arise with the implementation of these
recommendations in many countries, however. A lack of consuhation on
tax reform seems often to go hand in hand with a failure to respect
taxpayer rights and procedural or appeal processes in respect of
taxation."^ In this context, the IMF Code's incorporation of a requirement
to ensure taxpayer rights and due process is likely to increase taxpayer
capacity to engage in tax reform processes, though it is somewhat indirect.
Business and taxpayer associations may not exist or may be poorly
educated or resourced. There is often a need for "skilling up" both
parliamentarians and the wider population so as to enable them to
participate in consultation about tax refonns that affect them and the
broader public interest. Gordon and Thuronyi have also identified
inadequate coordination between the legislative branch and tax policy
makers in the Treasury or executive branch; they argue that it is important
both to educate and to consult with members of parhament, perhaps by the
mechanism of a parliamentary committee and with parliamentaiy staff.

notable exceptions: "Tax Legislative Process", in Victor Thuronyi (ed). Tax Law Design
and Drafting (Vol I , 1996: IMF, Washington DC), p. *. Advantages of such consultation
may include provision of an external, expert eye to identify issues, uncertainties or
problems with the law; the provision of examples and information about taxpayer
practices, accounting and other compliance issues; and ensuring professional or business
support for tax legislation and its effective implementation which is likely to be
politically important.
Moore & Rakner, *; Stewart, * (2008).
See, eg. Florens Luoga, "Taxpayers" Rights in the Context of Democratic
governance" (2002) 33(3) IDS Bulletin 50, referring to more than 12 stadies of the
Tanzanian tax system since 1990, none of which addressed the need for consultation or
the legal framework for taxation.
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although this will depend on institutional arrangements in each country.
Formal interest groups and business associations may be weak or subject
to co-option, so that there is inadequate demand for broad consultation and
influence by smaller groups is hidden.
The claim in support of consultation in both tax and expenditure
policy is that it enhances information-sharing, accountability, institutional
knowledge and public understanding, and this will in tum strengthen the
quality and legitimacy of tax policy. Often, however, there is an assumed
dichotomy between content and process in fiscal policy refomi. It is
implicit that a particular technical tax or spending reform as defined by
experts can be implemented more effectively i f better processes are in
place. This implicit assumption is consistent with what has been termed
the "technical idea" approach to a development intervention, used across
the broad field of development, in which "effective political engagement is
evidenced by receptivity to the technical idea and support of its
implementation".'^' However, the serious implementation of processoriented reforms is likely to lead to changes - indeed, significant
compromises - in the ultimate content of tax and spending proposals. Here
again, the discourse of transparency reflects an underlying tension
between the drive for fiscal discipline, one the one hand, and the desire to
achieve a legitimate fiscal bargain among citizens on the other.'^^
The IBP fomis part of an emergent NGO/civil society network that
aims to fill this democratic deficit, but confronts many barriers. It
operates at both the domestic and international levels, with limited
communication and coherence among different participants. The
importance of civil society or independent critique of budget policy has
been noted in a variety of contexts including tax expenditures and gender
budgeting, discussed above. Without extemal monitoring and pressure,
governments are unlikely to engage in meaningful disclosure or selfcriticism of their policies. However the challenges of developing a civil
society network that is both socially diverse and well-informed about

" ^ b i d . , p . 8.
Lise Rakner, "Tlie Politics of Revenue Mobilisation: Explaining Continuity in
Namibian Tax Policies" (2001) 1 Forum for Development Studies 125, p. 135.
Andrews (2008)
See, eg, Stewart [on Ghana VAT reform], *
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fiscal policy are also well known. We argue that the intemational codes
fail to prioritize information or processes that would serve economically
marginalized groups in the wider civil society, or foster critical analysis by
those interested in problems of poverty and inequality.
An alternative view of a successful development intervention by
international expeits or institutions, which is targeted towards local
"ownership" and warns against the wholesale implementation of extemal
technical ideas or blueprints without adequate local consideration, is
suggested by Andrews to involve the creation of "space in which the
developing entity can identify, define, and solve its own problems".The
dominant fiscal transparency norms, while acknowledging the importance
of accountability to legislatures, are not aimed at creating "space" for
political negotiation or engagement in the budget, even where the
intemational institutions have elsewhere begun to pay increased attention
to citizen participation. Just as there is a significant gap between stated
goals of country ownership and coordinating aid and loan funding
expenditures and their actual integration into recipient country budgets,
there is also a significant gap between the global institutional statements
conceming policy participation generally, and the specific processes
instituted and encouraged in the context of fiscal policy.
This gap is illustrated by comparing the OECD's approach to fiscal
transparency, which considers participation only marginally and the
considerable attention paid by the OECD in recent years to public
participation in government policy-making more generally in member
states. ^'^ The OECD distinguishes between mformation - "a one-way
relationship in which government produces and delivers information for
use by citizens", consultation - "a two-way relationship in which citizens
provide feedback to govemment" on a defined issue, and active
participation - "a relation based on partnership with government, in which
citizens actively engage in defining the process and content of policymaking".'^^ It seems safe to say that most efforts at engaging citizens in
'^^ Andrews (2008); and see Rodrik, Andrews (2004)
OECD, Citizens as Partners: Infonnation consultation and active participation in
policy making (2001); OECD, Evaluating public participation in policy making (2005).
OECD, Citizens as Partners, ibid, p. 23. Some commentators have called for increased
and more widespread participation in tax policy making: see Mark Burton "Towards
Participatoiy Tax Transparency" (2006) * Tax Notes International *; "Democratic Tax
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tax reform efforts or budget processes do not rise to the third level of
active participation.
Calls for "political space" and for increased citizen participation in
fiscal policy (and other policy aimed at development) tend to be grounded
in a notion of "deliberative democracy".Philip Pettit has argued for
deliberative democracy combining two dimensions: first, representative
"contestatory institutions" and second, institutions that remove some
decisions from the immediately political domain but which are designed to
empower participation.'^' Relevantly to our discussion of budget
transparency, the "contestatory institutions" ensure that "the people" are
"individually enabled to act as editors of the laws and policies that the
representatives author - and author in their collective name" while on the
other hand, the "depoliticising" institutions to "reduce" the "contestatory
burden", including constitutional constraints
and consultative
procedures.'^^
At their best, fiscal transparency laws and other laws relating to
budgeting would empower "contestation" - participation in fiscal
decision-making - through informing and enabling citizens - while at the
same time providing adequate constraints and procedures to enable
"realistic" outcomes to be achieved. These consti-aints could include, say.
Administration" in Margaret McKerctiar and Micliael Walpole (eds). More Issues in
Global Tax Administration (*, Fiscal Publications: Bath); in contrast to the call for
widespread "citizen" participation, Stewart has found that enhanced consultation in
business tax policy making in Australia has certainly strengthened a "shared ownership"
of the tax system between business and government but within a closed and tightly held
"network" of interdependence that does not incoiporate citizens or civil society more
broadly: Stewart (2008) in Cooper, Graeme (ed). Executing the Income Tax (Australian
Tax Research Foundation: *), p. *.
Although with a longer history in democratic theory (in particular sourced in
Habermas), the theory around deliberative democracy seems in fact to be being made
simultaneously with the various experiments with participation and consultation taking
place in development and policy practice: see, eg, Elster, J (ed) Deliberative Democracy
(1998) (Cambridge: Cambndge University Press); A Hamlin and P Pettit (eds). The Good
Polity: Normative Analysis of the State (NY: Basil Blackwell). In the development
context, it has been termed "deliberative development": see, eg, Kevin M Morrison and
Matthew M Singer, "Inequality and Deliberative Development: Revisiting Bolivia"s
Experience with the PRSP" (2007) 25(6) Development Policy Review 721-740.
Philip Pettit, "Depoliticizing Democracy" (2004) 17(1) Ratio Juris 52-65
Pettit, 2004, p. 61-63.
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the use of a MTEF; and requirements to assess the achievement of
development goals and to weigh distributive impact on both current and
future generations. We call on the IFIs to tum their attention to fostering
such "contestatory" processes and networks both locally within countries
and intemationally. What best practices could be identified at the country
level with respect to inclusion and resourcing of civil society participants?
Could transparency be broadened by promoting more effective
Parliamentary oversight of fiscal policy impacts including the wider use of
committees and local community consultations?

V I I . FORMALISATION, META-INSTITUTIONS AND
G L O B A L NORMS
This paper has sought to analyse and critique budget transparency
laws through a lens of social justice and democratic values. In this final
part, we discuss the role of law in the network of codes, standards and
regulators dealing with fiscal transparency that we have identified as
operating at both an international and national level and the import of
fiscal transparency for the broader project of "rating the world". Our
analysis suggests that the intemational institutions and even NGOs (such
as IBP) put considerable faith in law as a vehicle for mandating
transparency and accountability. However, scholars of law and
development have expressed scepticism about the role of law in
development and the ability of law reform to enhance or influence
development.'^'
The IMF Code and OECD Practices are prime examples of the
increasing role of "soft law" in transnational economic governance standards or nomis developed by quasi-public international institutions,
with a view to influencing policy development and practice at the state
level so as to convince markets of sound economic policy-making."" They
are just one element of a broader network of standards and codes at the
international level aimed at establishing "good governance" norms so as to
Davis, ICevin and Micliael Trebilcock, "The relationship between law and
development: optimists versus skeptics" forthcoming in American Journal of
Comparative Law (April 21, 2008).
Note, Allison Christians, "hard law and soft law" in international taxation (2007);
Schick, "hard mles" for fiscal restraint.
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achieve "macroeconomic stability and high-quality growth".'" Even the
"hardest" of the global rules, the Maastricht fiscal constraint for the euro
area, have been relaxed into predominantly procedural and reporting
requirements, while at the same time the European Commission has
sought to maintain the credibility of a strict commitment to tight fiscal
policy so as to support the Euro currency.
As the IMF Manual notes, the Code is "one of 12 standards that
have been recognised by the intemational community" (and endorsed by
the IMF and the World Bank) conceming govemance in various guises."^
The Code is also supported by private sector investors as one of 12 key
international standards deserving of priority implementation by
govemments.''^ The OECD Practices form an element of its overall
Policy Framework for Investment (11 May 2006) which proposes 10
pohcy "domains" that have the most impact on investment, sets out
questions or issues for govemments to consider in each domain and seeks
to "help to define the respective responsibilities of government, business
and other stakeholders and to pinpoint where intemational co-operation
can most effectively redress weaknesses in the investment
environment"."'' Transparency in policy development and implementation
is one of three core principles that underlie the framework, together with a
notion of "policy coherence" and regular evaluation of the impact of
policies.
In terms of expenditures, the expansion of efforts in respect of
expenditure transparency is a part of the World Banlc's wider efforts in
monitoring and implementing "govemance" reforms worldwide,
epitomised by the Governance Indicators published by the Bank and the

'•" IMF Manual (2007), above n 1, para I , p. 8
See http://www.imf.org/extemal/slandards/index.htm
12 Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems (1999) Financial Stability Fomm
<http://www.fsfomm.org/cos/key_standards.htm> at 10 October 2008.
OECD, Policy Framework for Investment, above n 63, 7. One question that arises is to
what extent non-government actors, in particular transnational corporations (but also,
increasingly, charities, NGOs and the international institutions themselves) are also called
upon to be "transparent". It is arguable that transnational corporations face much lower
expectations of transparency despite their very significant impact on the economy and
society, although it must be noted that transparency norms are also being urged on the
coiporate sector by the OECD and, of course, by national regulators.
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World Bank Institute that seek to measure govemance quality across six
dimensions and 212 countries and territories."^ Most of these dimensions
could incorporate fiscal transparency but it has not always been the subject
of attention (the categories are: "Voice and Accountability", "Political
Stability
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism", "Govemment
Effectiveness", "Regulatory Quality", "Rule of Law" and "Confiol of
Cormption").
The Indicators draw on a range of institutional,
govemmental, non-govemment and academic sources for components of
data and these have recently begun to include monitoring of fiscal
transparency."^
Together with the range of intemational regulators or observers,
led by the international financial institutions, these standards and codes
create a web of meta-regulation (of states by states and non-state actors) at
the intemational level that, together, ensure that govemments are subjected
more fully to the discipline of well informed markets. As illustrated in this
paper, this range of international standards can infiltrate local policy
making in a variety of ways, including country surveillance by IMF;
creation of OECD database which is then used by academic researchers to
rank countiy perfoimance; incentives for developing countries to
participate as a way of demonstrating good governance.
In particular countries, fiscal transparency norms may be
embedded in a legislative framework - that is, take on a formal legal
character - but they are more often built into procedural laws or codes to
which governments will adhere because of political, rather than legal
constraints. New Zealand, Australia and the UK, have chosen not to
legislate a hard target or rule but instead to apply transparency
requirements, in particular with a medium term expenditure framework, to
impose fiscal discipline. Many of these are not legislated, although they all
Daniel Kauftnann, Aart Kjaay and Massimo Mastrazzi, "Govemance Matters VII:
Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators 1996-2007 " (Policy Research Working
Paper No WPS4654, World Bank, 2008).
"" For example, one data source for the Governance Indicators is the Institutional Profiles
Database, a project of the French Government examining 85 developed and developing
countries, which commenced in 2006 and which includes an examination of transparency
of fiscal and tax policy, tax evasion, regulatory quality; ibid. Table A21. The Indicators
also draw on the International Budget Project Open Budget Index (since 2005), Table
A25.

66

C L P E RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

[VOL. 0 4 No. 07

legislate reporting, auditing and institutional independence requirements.
Many developing countries have attempted to combine hard legal
restrictions for deficits with a range of legal and non-legal transparency
obligations. Some, like India, provide a much more diverse set of reports
and information than is required in their legal system, largely in response
to legislator concems and an active and vocal civil society and NGO
sector.
As the transparency codes are primarily about govemment
credibility as regards economic policy, they may have the effect of binding
future govemments: "in practice it is also the case that given that the UK
now has a code in place it might be very difficult for a future government
to remove or substantially loosen the code without significant loss to its
economic credibility".''' A future government may, perhaps, only succeed
in removing the code in a time of crisis when emergency measures of
control might be called for (it is not yet clear whether the current financial
crisis, in which governments may be required to spend unprecedented
public funds on supporting the banking system and credit markets, would
qualify as an "out" to allow governments to legitimately operate with
significant fiscal deficits, or alternatively, to raise taxes.
Is a universal set of transparency norms desirable or useflil? Are
policies designed in one context are simply being transplanted elsewhere
without adequate attention to local visions of development or would local
development or experimentation - or grassroots action - be better? Mike
Stevens reminds us that it is important to look at the histoiy of budgeting
laws and processes in a country in analysing and seeking to "modemise"
the budgeting frameworks of many developing countries along the lines
proposed by the IMF and OECD."^ Local context is also emphasised by
Rodrik, who argues that institutions are central to development but the
most successful institutions tend to be local and embedded, where
development has been successful it has been in the context of local
institutional change.'"
We have identified in this paper that purely procedural approaches
Emmerson, Frayne and Love, above n 10, 39
Stevens, above n 9.
Rodrik, above n 97, *.
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to transparency tend to call for comprehensive and timely disclosure of
"relevant" fiscal information, so that outsiders can assess the
"performance" or "effectiveness" of government. Thus, budget
transparency may only or primarily ensure accountability of a govemment
to lenders and donors. A different sort of information and analysis may be
called for to ensure "effectiveness" of govemment performance, or
accountability, in a particular country or to local constituencies.
Formalisation itself may be of benefit more to outsiders than to locals, as
David Kennedy has observed, discussing the politics implicit in the
apparently netural goal of formalisation of systems for allocating property
rights or credit:^""
"In a particular developing society, for example, it
might be that the existing - discretionary, political,
informal - system for allocating licences or credit
is entirely predictable and reliable for some local
players even where it is not done in accordance
with published rales. At the same time it might not
be transparent to or reliable for foreign investors."
Similarly, discretionary or un-fomialised taxing or spending
powers may operate predictably for some people - most likely locals - but
not for extemal investors. There is, of course, a danger of relativism here discretionary powers are very likely to be apphed for the benefit of only
some and not all local players in a way that discriminates against the less
powerful and less well resourced in the economy, such as a mral
underclass, urban factory workers at the mercy of footloose industries, or
women. Nonetheless, it is important, as Keimedy observes, to
aclcnowledge the pohtics embedded in apparently neutral standards and
procedural nomis, from the beginning and upfront. Our goal is to do this
but also then to seek to empower and deepen that politics with a
democratic focus.
More generally, how might the transfer of budget transparency
nonns across borders challenge national control over economic policy?
Fiscal policies are classically the domain of national govemments, a core
element of the sovereign state. However, in particular (but not only) for
Kennedy, above n 6, 22.
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developing countries, tax and spending policies are increasingly
formulated at a global level, utilising expertise in intemational and
regional institutions. In the era of globalisation, the "fiscal compact" must
be understood as traversing national boundaries. It concems both the
relationship between a national govemment (or other levels of
government) and citizens in that country, and the relationship of those
citizens and that govemment with other countries and with organisations
in the intemational sphere. In this broad sense, the "fiscal compact"
encompasses aU elements of a govemment budget, including taxes,
spending, aid and debt, and the necessary political and institutional
arrangements necessary to sustain equitable development through the
budget.
Recently, various commentators have begun to envisage what
genuine global governance might look like. Dani Rodrik puts forward an
idealistic vision of global federalism in his book One Economics, Many
Recipes: Globalization, Institutions and Economic Growth ( 2 0 0 7 ) . Tax
lawyers and policy makers have envisaged various means of collecting
and distributing tax revenues at the global level either through
estabhshment of an intemational tax organisation that would enable
significantly enhanced cooperation and sharing between countries, or even
tiirough establishment of an intemational tax.^"' As outlined above, there
has also been a significant increase in cooperation regarding the delivery
of aid and implementation of lending - on one level, this is the "transfer"
element of a nascent global tax-transfer system.
What are the uses of fiscal transparency and governance norms in
an era of globalisation of fiscal policy? We suggest that fiscal frameworks
may perform a fimction of linking national govemments (and their
citizens) with each other and with international institutions. This could
indeed comprise a first step in meta-regulafion of a global fiscal
federation. The establishment of global legal norms conceming budget
transparency is an important first step. It combines with a move in many
sectors, but pushed primarily by NGOs, towards establishing increased
accountability generally for intemational agencies, in particular the
intemational financial institutions, in respect of their policy prescriptions

' Tanzi, Jinyan Li, Avi-Yonah
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and funding choices. We have witnessed the growth of transparency at
the intemational level, led by the IMF following significant pressure from
social movements who demanded greater transparency in IMF procedures,
policies and formulation of macroeconomic programmes. Publication of
country documents and organisational reports is now standard and there is
a mass of information available to country governments, academics and
citizens. There is a continuing and wide-ranging debate about reform of
the govemance stmcture of the IMF and other agencies and the IMF and
other organisations are, increasingly, directly engaging with civil society
as well as governments.^"^ This engagement is aimed on one level at
improving processes and outcomes of these agency activities. A fairly
widespread consultation took place in respect of the revision of the IMF
Code for Fiscal Transparency 2007. On another level, it is aimed at
increasing legitimacy of the IFIs themselves in the face of public
opposition to organisational policies. However, this involves agencies
such as the IMF, as Ben Thirkill-White explains, in a process which is
inevitably political and sits uneasily with its current technocratic fimction
of managing global stability.^"''
The significant developments in recent years conceming
transparency of budgets is likely to enhance the fiscal compact at a
national level. In addition, these processes lead to increased accountability
of national governments which are recipients of IFI loans or aid, to
external lenders and donors. However, while extemal accountability is
important for international lending and aid processes, it is less successful
at incorporating domestic pohtical and social perspectives. We argue that
national budgets remain the centrepiece for establishment of a sustainable
fiscal compact for development. New developments in international aid as
budget support have brought a global dimension to the fiscal compact
tlnough engagement of intemational agencies and donor countries with
Michael N . Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the World : International
Organizations in Global Politics (2004); Robert 0"Brien et al (eds). Contesting Global
Governance: Multilateral Economic Institutions and Global Social Movements (2000),
183.
Intemational Monetaiy Fund, Guide for Staff Relations with Civil Society
Organizations (2003) <http://w\vw.imf,oi-g/extemal/np/cso/eng/2003/101003.htm> at 22
September 2008.
Ben Thirkell-White, "The International Monetaiy Fund and Civil Society" (2004) 9(2)
New Pohtical Economy 251.
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recipient governments in budget policy making. This is promising in that
the budget process provides a space for the distributive and other
consequences of taxing and spending to be contested. A question is
whether the budget process can handle so many different policy goals and
stakeholders in an effective maimer.
In conclusion, we fmd that fiscal transparency norms have been
developed through a complex interaction of international and domestic
processes, public and private actors, and softer and harder legal forms.
While there is an obvious pattem of norm transfer from intemational
agencies to the domestic level, the reverse has also occuixed. Certain
developed countries have been especially influential in defining what
constitutes best practice and this points to a concem about the implications
of simply transplanting these norais around the world without adequate
attention to local priorities and stages of development. Further, the
distinction between soft and hard law is often blurry in this area. Informal
norms may have de facto enforcement mechanisms to do with market
credibility and access to loans, giving them some characteristics of hard
law for developing countries. Conversely, domestic fiscal transparency
legislation takes the form of hard law but its power may be primarily
symbolic and contingent on the strength of domestic institutions, making it
not dissimilar to soft law.
The emergence of common standards of fiscal transparency has the
potential to contribute to global coordination of both tax and spending
policies. However this paper calls for a careful balancing of these goals
with the need to promote a meaningful and inclusive fiscal politics at the
domestic level. Budgeting is primarily an activity of nation states, and any
particular fiscal bargain between growth- and equity-promoting policies
needs domestic support in order to gain traction. Intemational tax policy
literature has been largely preoccupied with the problem of how to
increase multilateral coordination in a manner that is consistent with internation equity. Our study draws attention to the equal importance of
domestic budget processes and institutions in generating the political
support needed for fiscal refonns, including any new forms of
transnational cooperation.
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